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Abstract
In this thesis, we explore the relationship between public policy and endogenous
health in the economy from three aspects.
First, we explore the health effects underlying the implementation of taxes. Taxes
on unhealthy commodities may fail in promoting health because the beneficial effects
of reducing unhealthy consumption could be offset by the simultaneous decrease in
health investment. However, when coupled with the revenue-neutral tax reforms
where income taxes are adjusted, taxes on unhealthy commodities can improve both
health and welfare more effectively.
Second, we take a non-paternalistic view to justify the role of sin taxes in terms of
fiscal externalities. Although the Pigouvian element in optimal sin taxes decreases
in the second-best setting, optimal sin taxes are not necessarily lower due to the
presence of the efficiency element. Our calibration on the UK economy shows that
the implementation of sin taxes have double-dividends which improve not only health
but also economic performance as well as welfare.
Third, we explore the relationship between labor supply and public policy. Old-
age labor supply increases with higher spending on health unless the additional
spending is funded through taxes on old-age labor income. The economic impacts
of changes in technologies are also examined. Furthermore, we find that the optimal
tax scheme is determined by the coefficients of relative risk aversion.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In recent decades, the leading risk factors of the global disease burden has changed
from communicable diseases in children to non-communicable diseases in adults (Lim
et al., 2013).1 According to the WHO report in 2018, non-communicable diseases
kill 41 million people each year, which is equivalent to 71% of all deaths globally.2 In
addition to their impacts on individual life span, these diseases also reduce individual
quality of life dramatically. As these diseases are usually related to lifestyles, policy
makers have recently focused more on individual lifestyle choices. For example, in
2011, the Hungarian government levied the “public health product tax” on food
products containing high levels of salt, sugar or other ingredients; the collected tax
revenue is earmarked for public health spending. The public health product tax is
generally believed to be effective in improving the dietary habits of the population
1Risk factors regarding communicable diseases in children include micro-nutrient deficiencies
and poor sanitation. Risk factors regarding non-communicable diseases include the consumption
of tobacco, alcohol, and ultra-processed food.
2https://www.who.int/en/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/noncommunicable-diseases
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in Hungary (B´ıro´, 2015). In 2012, the Philippine government passed a “sin tax
reform” with higher excise taxes on tobacco which are earmarked for public health
services. This sin tax reform not only creates more revenue for the government but
also reduces the prevalence of smoking (World Health Organization, 2015).
Although fiscal policies which target health in the economy have been widely
implemented in different countries, the mechanisms behind the health effects of
these policies have seldom been examined. The essential purpose of this thesis is
to find out exactly how public policies contribute to individual health and welfare
in the economy. We investigate variations in the economy regarding the changes in
policies when individual health is endogenized. Furthermore, we explore the optimal
policies for a government to maximize welfare in the economy.
In the following sections, we will illustrate the main literature discussed in this
thesis. In Section 1.1, we will introduce the concept of health in economics. In
Section 1.2, we will present the usual application of endogenous health in policy
analysis. In Section 1.3, we will provide a road map for this thesis.
1.1 Health in the economy
In the seminal work of Grossman (1972), the level of health is endogenous in that
it depends on the resources allocated to its production. The accumulated resources
in health can be viewed as a form of human capital which follows the law of motion
as below
ht+1 − ht = Mt − δtht, (1.1.1)
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where ht is the health capital in period t, M is the gross investment in health, and
δ is the rate of depreciation.
The difference between health capital and other forms of human capital is that
health capital does not directly increase labor productivity but enhances the amount
of time that one can spend on creating monetary earnings and commodities. Gross-
man (1972) distinguishes individual endowment time into “sick time” and “healthy
time”. Individuals can only work in their healthy time but not sick time. Therefore,
decisions about the investment in health are affected by not only the mental benefits
from higher levels of health but also the monetary benefits from more healthy time.
Health capital contributes to healthy time through a concave function (e.g. Galama
et al., 2012; Grossman, 2000; Kelly, 2017).
Ht = H(ht), (1.1.2)
where
Hh > 0, Hhh ≤ 0. (1.1.3)
In the above equation, Ht denotes individual healthy time in period t.
The concept of endogenous health is widely applied in macroeconomics. Ehrlich
and Chuma (1990) specify a demand function for longevity to explain the trends in
life expectancy and variations in exposure to risk factors across different populations.
In their model, individual lifetime utility (LU) is set to be separable over time within
a finite time framework:
LU ≡
∫ T
0
e−ρtU(c(t), H(h(t)))dt, (1.1.4)
where c denotes consumption and ρ denotes the rate of time preference. An impor-
tant feature of this model is that individuals have to choose the length of their life
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span (T ) along with consumption and health investment. Hence, this study implies
that individuals have to make the trade-off between quality of life – consumption
and healthy time – and quantity of life – longevity. The results of this study pro-
vide the link between longevity and other economic variables, such as initial wealth,
education, medical costs, and age.
In line with Ehrlich and Chuma (1990), Hall and Jones (2007) also explore
the trade-off between quality and quantity of life by solving the optimal allocation
between consumption and health investment. They construct a dynamic model to
rationalize the steady growth in health spending in the US. In their model, they
provide a direct link between life expectancy and health investment so as to cover
the discussion about mortality in the economy. The basic setting of their model
follows:
max f(h)u(c), (1.1.5)
s.t. c+ h = y, (1.1.6)
where y denotes income and f denotes life expectancy which is an increasing function
of health investment h. Moreover, they employ a utility function which allows for
the elasticity of marginal utility to be well above one.3 The marginal utility of
consumption thus falls rapidly as the level of consumption increases. A rise in
health spending in the US is therefore the rational response to its steady growth of
income per person.
3In Hall and Jones (2007), the utility function takes the form of u(c) = b+ c1−γ/(1− γ), where
b and γ are both constants. In this case, the consumption elasticity u′(c)c/u becomes a decreasing
function in the level of consumption.
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To investigate the relationship between health and portfolio choices after retire-
ment, Yogo (2016) develops a life-cycle model where retirees face stochastic depreci-
ation in health. This stochastic depreciation affects not only the marginal utility of
consumption but also the life expectancy of retirees. The role of health is endoge-
nized in that retirees make decisions on the amount of spending on health investment
which determines the levels their health. This study indicates a positive relation-
ship between health and the portfolio share in stocks. The rationale is that healthier
retirees expect longer life time and are thus more willing to invest in risky assets.
Moreover, this study points out that retirees with poor health generally have higher
levels of out-of-pocket health expenditure. The reason is that the marginal product
of health is higher for individuals with poor health because of the decreasing returns
in health investment.
The concept of endogenous health is also employed in other topics in economics.
For example, Baird et al. (2016) estimate long-run impacts of school-based deworm-
ing programs and find that these programs bring more future government revenue
than costs. Descheˆnes et al. (2017) develop a measure of willingness to pay for air
quality improvement based on Grossman’s idea of demand for health.
1.2 Health and public policies
The inclusion of health in economic models provides the room to analyze health
related policies. Fiscal policies targeting certain health goals are one type of policy
which have been explored most extensively in the literature. However, we find that
these studies generally take a paternalistic view which assumes that the government
1.2. Health and public policies 6
knows better than individuals in terms of their own health and decisions.
O’Donoghue and Rabin (2006) justify the role of sin taxes on unhealthy com-
modities when individuals have self-control problems. The objective function in
their model follows the form as below.
u(x, c) ≡ v(x; ρ)− βf(x; γ) + c, (1.2.7)
where v(·) represents the immediate utility benefits from consuming unhealthy
commodities x, f(·) represents the negative health consequences from consuming
x, c represents the composite good, β is the parameter which captures the time-
inconsistent preference for immediate gratification, and ρ and γ are the parameters
which capture population characteristics. The cases with β < 1 implies that individ-
uals have short-term desires for x and that they may consume too many unhealthy
commodities. To restore the Pareto optimum, the government should implement
sin taxes to repress the extra consumption of x. Moreover, O’Donoghue and Ra-
bin (2006) believe that sin taxes are beneficial also to individuals who do not have
self-control problems as they receive the subsidies transferred from sin taxes.
Cremer et al. (2012) investigate the effects of sin taxes when individuals do
not fully recognize the role of health. They develop a two-period model with the
objective function as below:
Ui = u(ci) + ψ(xi) + u(di) + αih(xi, ei), (1.2.8)
where ci and di are the first- and second-period consumption of individual i, xi is the
consumption of sin goods, ei is the investment in health. Both u and ψ are concave
functions, and h(·) is the health function which is decreasing in x but increasing in
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e. The parameter α denotes the level of recognition toward the role of health in
the second period. This parameter captures the issue of myopia when individuals
underestimate the detrimental effects of unhealthy commodities x on health. With
myopic individuals in the economy, the government should implement sin taxes along
with subsidies to restore the social optimum. Cremer et al. (2012) further analyze
the second-best case where the revenue of sin taxes is earmarked for health care
spending. Their results show that this policy combination is also welfare improving.
To identify the impacts of certain unhealthy commodities on health, Goulao
and Pe´rez-Barahona (2014) extend Grossman’s model by including the detrimental
effects of unhealthy commodities into the health accumulation function:
ht+1 = (1− δ)ht + σmt − αxt, (1.2.9)
where h is the stock of health, m is the health investment, δ is the rate of de-
preciation, x is the consumption of unhealthy commodities, and both σ and α are
parameters. They further consider the case where individual have limited informa-
tion about health by forming the following law of motion perceived by individuals:
ht+1 = (1− δ)ht + σmt − αxt, (1.2.10)
where 0 <  < 1 represents individual level of recognition toward the detrimental
effects of unhealthy commodities. With  lower than unity, individuals tend to reach
a lower level of health than what is socially optimal. Nevertheless, the government
can restore the social optimum by taxing unhealthy commodities and subsidizing
health investment.
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1.3 A road map for this thesis
In this thesis, we explore the interrelationship between health and policies from
three aspects: the mechanism underlying the health effects of taxes, the structure
of optimal sin taxes, and the role of taxes in the economy when health affects the
duration of individual lifetime.
In Chapter 2, we explore the mechanism underlying the health effects of taxes on
unhealthy commodities by developing a general equilibrium model with endogenous
health. This model is characterized by a goods sector which produces commodi-
ties and a health sector which generates the stock of health. In line with empirical
findings in the epidemiological literature, our analytical results suggest that the im-
plementation of unhealthy commodities taxes alone may be ineffective in improving
health in the long run. The explanation toward this well-documented fact is that
individuals would decrease the investment in health in response to higher unhealthy
commodity taxes. We further find that, when coupled with a reduction in income tax
rate through a revenue-neutral reform, the implementation of unhealthy commodity
taxes can effectively improve health through income effects. Moreover, the level of
welfare can be raised by the reforms. These findings are backed with simulation
analysis on the US economy.
In Chapter 3, we explore the structure of optimal sin taxes in the presence of
income taxes by extending the model developed in Chapter 2. In this chapter, we
take a non-paternalistic view to justify the role of sin taxes based on the short- and
the long-term externalities on public health care. We find that the additive prop-
erty between the Pigouvian element and the efficiency element proposed by Sandmo
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(1975) is retained in our model. Although the Pigouvian element is distorted down-
ward by income taxes, the second-best optimal sin taxes are not necessarily lower
due to the presence of the efficiency element. This analytical result is supported by
our calibration on the UK economy. Moreover, to further explore the property of
sin taxes, we construct a “sin tax reform” with reductions in labor income tax rate.
The simulation regarding this reform shows that sin taxes have the double-dividends
which improve not only individual health but also economic performance as well as
welfare in the UK.
In Chapter 4, we examine the role of taxes in an economy with endogenous
lifetime. We extend the basic model of Fletcher et al. (2010) and Leroux and Pon-
thiere (2018) by endogenizing the formation of health and including the role of tax
policies in the economy. We divide an individual life cycle into two periods: the
period when individuals are young and the period when individuals are old. In
our model, the government collects taxes to fund public health care. With higher
provision of health care, individuals enjoy higher probabilities of survival into old
age. The calibration on the UK economy indicates that a higher level of spending
on health care can generally encourage labor supply during old age. However, this
statement would be reversed if the additional spending is mainly funded through
heavier taxes on old-age labor income. Moreover, we examine the economic impacts
of variations in production and medical technologies in this framework. In response
to improvements in production technologies, individuals increase consumption and
labor supply in both young and old age. Our calibration results suggest that these
increases translate into higher survival probabilities in equilibrium. In response to
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improvements in medical technologies, individuals offer more labor supply during
old age but less when they are young. These changes have to be applied so that the
intertemporal marginal rate of substitution toward labor supply can be maintained.
The resulting survival probabilities are lower because the fiscal impacts of decreasing
the young-age labor supply outweigh those of increasing the old-age labor supply.
Furthermore, we derive an optimal tax scheme for welfare maximization. We find
that optimal labor income taxes depend on the coefficients of risk aversion toward
consumption and labor supply. The implementation of the optimal tax scheme con-
tributes to a smoother consumption path with higher levels of consumption over
lifetime. Moreover, individuals also obtain a smoother labor choice over time under
the optimal tax scheme with labor supply lower during young age but higher during
old age.
Finally, summaries of each chapters and future works are provided in Chapter 5
to conclude this thesis.
Chapter 2
Tax reform, unhealthy
commodities and endogenous
health
In this chapter, we examine the impacts of taxes on unhealthy commodities on con-
sumer behavior and welfare by developing a dynamic general equilibrium model with
endogenous health. Analytical results suggest that taxes on unhealthy commodities
may fail to improve health because the beneficial impacts of reducing unhealthy
consumption could be offset by a simultaneous decrease in health investment. The
simulation results in this chapter show that, when coupled with tax reforms where
income taxes are adjusted, taxes on unhealthy commodities can improve health and
welfare more effectively. This analysis may inform policy making decisions on tax-
ation of unhealthy commodities when a government can adjust pre-existing taxes.
11
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2.1 Introduction
The rising global burden of non-communicable diseases such as diabetes, cardio-
vascular and coronary heart diseases, and certain types of cancer has driven pol-
icy makers to explore approaches to improve population health (Lim et al., 2013).
Since many major health problems are due to individual behaviors such as over-
consumption of foods and beverages with high fat, sugar and salt content, it is
possible to use fiscal policy to target these unhealthy commodities (e.g. Chokshi
and Farley, 2014; Lustig et al., 2012). Changing the relative prices of these com-
modities via taxation is one of the policies which has been proposed and explored
the most in the public arena. Examples include the public health product tax in
Hungary, several taxes on saturated fat in Denmark, and the Soft Drink Industry
Levy (also known as the “sugar tax”) in the UK.
Taxes on unhealthy commodities discourage consumption and therefore should
contribute to a higher level of population health. However, existing studies do not
always support this intuition. Fletcher et al. (2010) find that soft drink taxes in
the US induce significant changes in consumer behavior, but the impacts on body
mass index (BMI) are small in magnitude. Mytton et al. (2007) even show that
taxes on saturated fat in the UK would not reduce the incidence of cardiovascular
diseases because the beneficial effects from decreases in saturated fat would be offset
by increases in salt intake. Schroeter et al. (2008) warn that people could consume
other, untaxed, unhealthy commodities in response, and thus increase their BMI.
Yaniv et al. (2009) explain that, even if a fat tax reduces the consumption of junk
foods, obesity could still rise because individuals might spend less time exercising.
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One interesting finding in the literature is that, when coupled with other fiscal
instruments such as subsidies, taxes on unhealthy commodities are more likely to be
beneficial to health (e.g. Cornelsen and Carreido, 2015; Franck et al., 2013; Nnoa-
ham et al., 2009). This finding suggests that the government should consider more
comprehensive policies to ensure a positive impact on health.
One mechanism which may help explain the results is the health investment,
such as exercise and health care (e.g. Goulao and Pe´rez-Barahona, 2014; Grossman,
1972).1 Indeed, if taxes on unhealthy commodities induce individuals to invest less
in health, the taxes might fail to improve population health. In the canonical model
of Grossman (1972), health is considered as a capital stock. Individuals invest in
health not only because it provides utility, but also because it increases the amount of
healthy time available for labor supply. Goulao and Pe´rez-Barahona (2014) include
the detrimental effects of unhealthy commodities into Grossman’s health function,
so that they can identify the impacts of the consumption on health. Their results
show that taxes on unhealthy commodities, when coupled with subsidies on health
investment, can restore the optimal level of health when individuals are myopic.2
The mechanism of health investment is also used in this chapter. Different
from Grossman (1972) and Goulao and Pe´rez-Barahona (2014), we fully endogenize
1The epidemiological literature provides some evidence that exercise and health care could
improve the level of health both in the short and long run (e.g. Lucas et al., 2003; Nemet et al.,
2005; Oja et al., 2016).
2O’Donoghue and Rabin (2006) and Cremer et al. (2012) also study the role of taxes on un-
healthy commodities in an economy with myopic households, but they do not specify the equations
to illustrate the law of motion of health.
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health investment by specifying the health production function. We construct a
dynamic general equilibrium model with two sectors: the goods sector, which pro-
duces consumption commodities, and the health sector, which provides individuals
with health. The economy is populated with infinitely-lived dynastic representative
individuals.3 The concept of health in our model is in line with Grossman (1972)
in that health provides both utility and income benefits, so that we can examine
how individual levels of health are determined clearly. This endogenous health de-
cision is important in this chapter because unhealthy commodity taxes are usually
employed to target health problems related to consumption choices. Different from
Goulao and Pe´rez-Barahona (2014), we endogenize individual income by addressing
both labor supply and capital in the economy. By doing so, we are able to highlight
the roles of different fiscal instruments (taxes on labor income, capital income, and
consumption), and thus the efficacy of the tax reforms. One novelty of our model
is found in how it embeds individual preference for health in that of leisure. To be
more specific, we model how the stock of health affects individual healthy time.4 In-
dividuals can allocate healthy time into either leisure or labor supply. This novelty
helps us to clarify the trade-off between leisure and labor supply when it comes to
3The dynastic model is also used by Tobing (2011) and Kelly (2017) to discuss the role of health
on growth. This chapter is different in that (1) we focus on the role of healthy time on labor-leisure
choices; and (2) we examine the impacts of taxes on health and welfare instead of growth.
4Another way of modeling health is to embed it in the concept of longevity. These studies
usually employ a finite horizon (e.g. Ehrlich and Chuma, 1990; Kuhn et al., 2015) or allow health
to affect mortality (or survival probability) at each point of time (e.g. Hall and Jones, 2007; Jones,
2016). However, longevity is not the focus of this chapter.
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the changes in taxes on labor income. Unhealthy commodities, which also provide
individuals with utility, pose detrimental effects on the accumulation of health. In-
dividuals have to find the balance between the utility and detrimental effects from
these commodities. In addition to the utility function, we also specify the produc-
tion function of health with labor supply and capital. This specification allows us
to carefully examine the changes in individual investment decision between the two
sectors in response to the taxes. Our results indicate that the implementation of
taxes on unhealthy commodities does not improve the level of health directly in
the steady state. As documented in the literature, one way to improve both the
levels of health and welfare through unhealthy commodity taxes is to earmark the
tax revenue for health investment subsidies (e.g. Aronsson and Thunstro¨m, 2008;
Cremer et al., 2016). In this chapter, we propose alternative revenue-neutral tax
reforms which raise taxes on unhealthy commodities but lower those on income.
These alternative reforms lead to similar desired results in that the steady state
levels of health and welfare are improved more efficiently.
The chapter proceeds as follows. A two-sector model with endogenous health
and its optimal conditions will be discussed in Section 2.2. In Section 2.3, we will
calibrate the model on the US economy. A tax analysis will be performed based on
the steady state solutions. Two revenue-neutral tax reforms will be proposed: the
reform which levies unhealthy commodity taxes while adjusting labor income taxes,
and the reform which levies unhealthy commodity taxes while adjusting capital
income taxes. A welfare analysis of the reforms will be performed as well. Finally,
conclusions will be offered in Section 2.4.
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2.2 The model
In our model, individuals can freely allocate healthy time into leisure or labor sup-
ply.5 Healthy time can be obtained through the accumulation of the stock of health,
h, with decreasing marginal returns (Grossman, 1972). h is between zero and a
maximum value which is assumed to be above its own steady state level. When h is
zero, no healthy time is produced. Individuals determine l fraction of healthy time
spent on labor supply and leaves (1 − l) for leisure. The individual lifetime utility
is set as follows:
U =
∫ ∞
0
u(c, x, L)e−ρtdt, (2.2.1)
where
L ≡ (1− l)hµ.
In the above equations, c denotes the numeraire commodities, x denotes the un-
healthy commodities, L denotes the leisure when individuals are healthy, ρ denotes
the rate of time preference, and µ denotes the efficiency of the stock of health in gen-
erating healthy time. Following Grossman (1972), h generates healthy time through
a concave function. Therefore, we assume that 0 < µ < 1.
The economy is constituted by the goods sector and the health sector, and both
sectors require inputs of capital and labor supply.
y = f(sk, vlhµ), (2.2.2)
5As in Grossman (1972), total individual time is given by healthy time plus sick time. In this
chapter, individuals can enjoy leisure or offer labor supply during their healthy time but not during
sick time.
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m = m((1− s)k, (1− v)lhµ), (2.2.3)
where y is the output of the goods sector, m is the flow of health services generated
from the health sector, k is the physical capital, and s and v are the fractions of
capital and labor supply devoted into the goods sector. Equation (2.2.2) and (3.2.6)
are both assumed to have homogeneity of degree one. Hence, both sectors can be
described by the representative firms.
The goods sector produces c and x which are distinguishable in the market
demand.6 The prices of the two goods are standardized into unity for simplicity.
Consequently, the law of motion for k is set as follows:
k˙ = y − c− x, (2.2.4)
where the variables with a dot on the top represents the growth of that variable
hereafter.
As in Goulao and Pe´rez-Barahona (2014), x enters the law of motion for h in
the following form:
h˙ = m− ηx− δh, (2.2.5)
where η ≥ 0 and δ ≥ 0. In this expression, η is the measure of the detrimental effects
of x on h. The extreme case of η = 0 refers to the situation where the detrimental
effects of x are negligible.
6Some studies investigate role of unhealthy commodities from the supply side (e.g. Bonita et al.,
2013). This chapter however focuses on the consumer behaviors from a macroeconomic perspective.
Hence, without the loss of generality, the goods sector in our model is represented by the aggregate
production of c and x.
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Notice that, with µ < 1, our model cannot produce endogenous growth. For
endogenous growth to occur, k and h have to grow at the same rate (followed by
the inspection of equations (2.2.4) and (2.2.5)). Also, output divided by k must
be constant. Since the production function (2.2.2) is homogeneous of degree one,
lhµ/k has to be constant. This ratio would not be constant if h and k grow at
the same rate. Also note that, individuals own the representative firms and receive
their profits accordingly. Nevertheless, the profits are zero in equilibrium because
we assume homogeneity of degree one in productions.
2.2.1 The decentralized economy
In a decentralized economy, the firms in both sectors seek to maximize their own
profits. The rental prices of capital and labor supply are thus
ry = f1, (2.2.6a)
wy = f2, (2.2.6b)
rm = pmm1, (2.2.6c)
wm = pmm2. (2.2.6d)
In this expression, ri and wi are the rental prices of capital (k) and labor (lh
µ) in
the i sector, f1 and f2 are the marginal product of capital and that of labor supply
in the goods sector (y), m1 and m2 are the marginal product of capital and that of
labor supply in the health sector (m). pm is the relative price of health services.
The government receives tax revenue from taxes on capital income, labor income,
and commodities. Assuming the government balances its budget by financing a
2.2. The model 19
lump-sum transfer, G, the government budget can be presented as below
G = τk(sry + (1− s)rm)k + τl(vwy + (1− v)wm)lhµ + τcc+ τxx, (2.2.7)
where τk, τl, τc, and τx are the taxes on capital income, labor income, numeraire
commodities, and unhealthy commodities respectively.
Individuals purchase c, x, and m and pay taxes. The taxes they pay are trans-
ferred back to them in the form of G. Consequently, we transform equation (2.2.4)
into
k˙ = (1− τk)(rysk + rm(1− s)k) + (1− τl)(wyvlhµ + wm(1− v)lhµ)
− (1 + τc)c− (1 + τx)x− pmm+G+R.
(2.2.8)
where R denotes profits of the representative firm received by individuals. It should
be noted that R = 0 when the firm has constant returns to scale (CRTS) and that
R > 0 when the firm has decreasing returns to scale (DRTS). In line with our
assumption on the production function, R = 0. When any two equations of (2.2.4),
(2.2.7), and (2.2.8) hold, the third one also holds.
2.2.2 The optimization problem
Individuals maximize the utility (2.2.1) with the constraints of (2.2.5) and (2.2.8).
The Hamiltonian function is
H =u(c, x, L) + λ[(1− τk)(rysk + rm(1− s)k) + (1− τl)(wyvlhµ + wm(1− v)lhµ)
− (1 + τc)c− (1 + τx)x− pmm+G+R] + q[m− ηx− δh],
where λ is the shadow price of capital, and q is the shadow price of health. The
first-order conditions for this optimization problem are:
uc = λ(1 + τc), (2.2.9a)
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ux = λ(1 + τx) + qη, (2.2.9b)
uL = λ(1− τl)(wyv + wm(1− v)), (2.2.9c)
ry = rm, (2.2.9d)
wy = wm, (2.2.9e)
λpm = q, (2.2.9f)
λ(1− τk)(rys+ rm(1− s)) = λρ− λ˙, (2.2.9g)
µuL(1− l)hµ−1 + λµ(1− τl)(wyvlhµ−1 + wm(1− v)lhµ−1)− qδ = qρ− q˙, (2.2.9h)
along with the transversality conditions,
lim
t→∞
e−ρtλ(t)k(t) = 0, (2.2.9i)
lim
t→∞
e−ρtq(t)h(t) = 0. (2.2.9j)
Equation (2.2.9a) equates the optimal consumption of numeraire goods to the prod-
uct of the shadow price of k and the after-tax price of the goods; equation (2.2.9b)
shows that the optimal consumption of unhealthy commodities is related to both
the shadow price of k and that of h; equation (2.2.9c) equates the marginal util-
ity of leisure to the marginal costs of labor supply; equations (2.2.9d) and (2.2.9e)
describe the optimal allocation of inputs between the two sectors; equation (2.2.9f)
implies that the relative value of the two shadow prices depends on pm; equations
(2.2.9g) and (2.2.9h) are the Euler equations; and equations (2.2.9i) and (2.2.9j) are
the conditions to exclude Ponzi games in the economy.
With equation (2.2.9d), we can reform the evolution of λ from equation (2.2.9g)
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as
λ˙
λ
= ρ− (1− τk)r, (2.2.10)
where r = ry = rm. With equations (2.2.9c), (2.2.9e), and (2.2.9f), the evolution of
q in equation (2.2.9h) can be written as
q˙
q
= ρ+ δ − µ
pm
(1− τl)whµ−1, (2.2.11)
where w = wy = wm.
2.2.3 The equilibrium
With equations (2.2.6a), (2.2.6b), (2.2.9g), and (2.2.9h), we obtain the steady state
level of h as follows
h∗ =
( wµ(1− τl)ρ
rpm(ρ+ δ)(1− τk)
) 1
1−µ
. (2.2.12)
The asterisk indicates steady states hereafter. Providing m has CRTS, the labor-
capital ratio in the m sector would be fixed in equilibrium. Accordingly, the ratio of
rm to wm and thus pm would also be pinned down. Referring to equations (2.2.9d)
and (2.2.9e), the rental prices of capital and wages are identical across both sectors.
Therefore, the ratio of ry to wy is also fixed in equilibrium. Moreover, with the
linearity of x in equation (2.2.5), reductions in x due higher τx cannot alter this
fixed ratio. This inference implies the following proposition:
Proposition 2.1 With a constant labor-capital ratio in the health sector, taxes on
unhealthy commodities do not affect the level of health in equilibrium.
The reason why τx may fail in improving h
∗ is that m has to decrease in response
to the decrease in x, so that the steady state condition for equation (2.2.5) can be
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held. The story behind this proposition is that individuals find it beneficial to
decrease the investment in health when the detrimental effects from x diminish.
Therefore, the effects of reducing health investment offset the beneficial effects of
reducing x. The finding that the simultaneous decrease in m weakens the beneficial
impacts of τx on h
∗ also holds in the case where m does not have CRTS.7
2.2.4 Parameterization
To examine the economic impacts of tax policies through simulation, we adopt
specific functions for equation (2.2.1)-(3.2.6) in this subsection. The utility function
(2.2.1) is set to be the following form:
u(c, x, L) = ln c+ θ lnx+ ψ ln((1− l)hµ), (2.2.13)
where θ is the preference to x, and ψ is the preference to L. The production functions
follow the Cobb-Douglas forms:
y = A (sk)α (vlhµ)(1−α) , (2.2.14)
m = B ((1− s)k)β ((1− v)lhµ)(1−β) , (2.2.15)
where α and β are the shares of capital and A and B are production efficiency
factors in the two sectors. In line with Grossman (1972), we take the CRTS m as
the benchmark. Our inference that the beneficial effects of τx would be weakened
by the decreases in m holds even without the restriction of CRTS. As suggested in
Galama et al. (2012) and Halliday et al. (2017), m could have DRTS. The analysis
with the DRTS m is presented in Appendix 2.A.3.
7More detailed analysis can be found in Appendix 2.A.3.
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With the specified production functions, we are able to clarify the relationship
between s and v by using equations (2.2.9d) and (2.2.9e):
v =
β(1− α)s
α(1− β)− (α− β)s, (2.2.16)
which implies that v is increasing in s when α ≥ β.
With λ˙ = 0 in the steady state, we derive the following condition from equations
(2.2.6a), (2.2.10), and (2.2.14).
lhµ
k
=
s
v
( ρ
αA(1− τk)
) 1
1−α
. (2.2.17)
The left-hand side of the equation is the labor-capital ratio in the economy. With
equations (2.2.6b), (3.2.9), (2.2.14), and the condition q˙ = 0, we find that
lhµ
k
=
s
v
(µA(1− τl)(1− α)
pm(δ + ρ)
) 1
α
h
−(1−µ)
α . (2.2.18)
By combining equations (2.2.17) and (2.2.18), we can characterize h∗ as
h∗ =
(αA(1− τk)
ρ
) α
(1−α)(1−µ)
(µA(1− τl)(1− α)
pm(δ + ρ)
) 1
1−µ
. (2.2.19)
The specified function pm can be obtained from equations (2.2.6c), (2.2.10), and
(2.2.17).
pm =
α
α(1−β)
1−α
ββ
(1− α
1− β
)1−β(A 1−β1−α
B
)(1− τk
ρ
)α−β
1−α
. (2.2.20)
This equation indicates that the relative price of m is affected by the production
efficiency factors in both sectors. Given inputs in both sectors, a higherA contributes
to a more efficient production in the goods sector compared to that in the health
sector, and thus decreases the relative prices of the products in the goods sector.
On the other hand, pm decreases as B raises the relative productivity in the health
sector. Equation (2.2.20) also implies a negative relationship between τk and pm.
2.2. The model 24
The reason behind this negative relationship is that higher capital income taxes
(τk) reduce the after-tax marginal product of k (as in equation (2.2.9g)) and thus
decrease the relative shadow price of q to λ. Referring to equation (2.2.9f), pm is
determined by the ratio of q to λ. A relatively lower level of q thus implies a lower
level of pm.
The steady state level of k can be obtained through equations (2.2.17) and
(2.2.19):
k∗ =
v∗
s∗
(αA(1− τk)
ρ
) 1
1−α
l∗(h∗)µ, (2.2.21)
where k∗ has to increase as , l∗(h∗)µ increases, so that the labor-capital ratio is fixed
in equilibrium.
By using equation (2.2.9b), we have
x∗ =
θ(1 + τc)
1 + τx + pmη
c∗. (2.2.22)
We find that ∂x∗/∂τx < 0 given c∗, indicating that an increase in τx does deter
the consumption of x. This finding is in line with the prevailing hypothesis of the
supporters of taxes on unhealthy commodities.
Next, we rewrite equation (2.2.9c) into:
c∗ =
pm(ρ+ δ)
µψ(1 + τc)
(1− l∗)h∗. (2.2.23)
With equations (2.2.15), (2.2.18), and (2.2.22), equation (2.2.5) in the steady state
can be rewritten as
ρ+ δ
µ(1− β)(1− τl)(1− v)l
∗h∗ =
ηθ(1 + τc)
1 + τx + pmη
c∗ + δh∗. (2.2.24)
With equations (2.2.17) and (2.2.22), the market clearing condition in the goods
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sector, y = x+ c, can be transformed into
pm(ρ+ δ)v
∗l∗h∗
µ(1− τl)(1− α) =
(pi + θ(1 + τc))c
∗
pi
, (2.2.25)
where
pi = 1 + τx + pmη.
Equations (2.2.19), (2.2.23), (2.2.24), and (2.2.25) form a system which could be
used to solve for the solutions of c∗, l∗, and v∗:
c∗ =
ω(1− τl)(1− l∗)h∗
ψ(1 + τc)
, (2.2.26)
l∗ =
pm(1− β)(δpih∗ + ηθ(1 + τc)c∗)
ω(1− v∗)pih∗ , (2.2.27)
v∗ =
(1− α)(pi + θ(1 + τc))c∗
piωl∗h∗
, (2.2.28)
where
ω =
pm(ρ+ δ)
µ(1− τl) .
With equation (2.2.16), we can further obtain the solution of s∗.
s∗ =
α(1− β)(pi + θ(1 + τc))c∗
(α− β)(pi + θ(1 + τc))c∗ + βpiωl∗h∗ (2.2.29)
With the specified functions, we can rewrite equations (2.2.26)-(2.2.29) into closed-
form solutions. The closed-form solutions are presented in Appendix 2.A.1.
2.3 Policy analysis
In this section, we calibrate the model on the US economy, and then simulate the
economic impacts of implementing τx alone and those of our proposed revenue-
neutral tax reforms: the reform of implementing τx with adjustments in τl, and the
reform of implementing τx with adjustments in τk.
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2.3.1 Calibration
Based on the estimation of Mitnitski et al. (2002), we calibrate the value of δ as
0.043.8 The initial tax rates are set to be τl = 0.20, τk = 0.27 and τc = τx = 0.08 in
accordance with the average tax rates in the US from 1970 to 2013.9 ρ is selected as
0.04 following Azariadis et al. (2013). α is set to be 0.3 as in Chen and Lu (2013)
and β is set to be 0.22 as in Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2008). It is worth noting
that, referring to equation (2.2.16), the observation of α = 0.3 and β = 0.22 implies
v′(s) ≥ 0. The initial level of l∗ is selected as 0.25 in accordance with the observation
of Prescott (2006). We normalize the initial level of y to unity for simplicity.
The OECD statistics shows that the ratio of health expenditure to GDP in the US
between 1970 and 2013 is around 11%.10 Note that GDP in our model is y + pmm.
Therefore, with the normalization of y, pmm is calculated as 0.1236. Moreover,
Data retrieved from the Bureau of Labor Statistics Consumer Survey shows that
the household expenditure on food-away-from-home 2013-2015 is around 5% as a
ratio of average annual expenditure.11 Consequently, we calibrate the initial level of
x∗ as 0.0562. With the goods market clearing condition y = c + x, the initial c∗ is
8Considering the similarity in natural forces of health depreciation, the data of Canadian pop-
ulation can be a good approximation for the US population (e.g. Dalgaard and Strulik, 2014;
Rockwood and Mitnitski, 2007; Strulik, 2015).
9Data source: http://www.caramcdaniel.com/researchpapers. We obtain the updated data
in February 2017. These average tax rates are calculated by using the methods provided in Mc-
Daniel (2007).
10Data Source: http://stats.oecd.org/.
11Data source: https://www.bls.gov/cex/.
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calibrated as 0.9438.
Referring to equations (2.2.9d) and (2.2.9e), we find that the initial s and v are
0.9169 and 0.8790 with the specified parameters. Accordingly, the value of ψ can be
calculated as 1.8751 by using equations (2.2.6b), (2.2.6d), and (2.2.9e). The initial
k∗ is calibrated as 5.9712 by using equations (2.2.9g), (2.2.6a), (2.2.6c), and (2.2.9d).
The determination of the initial pm is relatively flexible, because a different pm
could be the result of m being calculated in different units. For simplicity, we set
the initial pm to be unity.
To provide a clearer view, we summarize the benchmark parameters and variables
in Table 2.1 and the calibration Table 2.2.
Table 2.1: Benchmark parameters and variables
Benchmark parameters and variables
Share of physical capital in the goods sector α 0.3
Share of physical capital in the health sector β 0.22
Rate of time preference ρ 0.04
Natural depreciation of health δ 0.043
Capital income taxes τk 0.27
Labor income taxes τl 0.20
Commodity taxes τc & τx 0.08
Initial fraction of time allocated to labor supply l0 0.25
Initial production in the goods sector y0 1
Ratio of health expenditure to GDP pmm/GDP 0.11
Ratio of unhealthy commodities to GDP x/GDP 0.05
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Table 2.2: Benchmark calibration
Benchmark calibration
Relative preference to leisure ψ 1.8751
Ratio of numeraire commodities to output production c0/y0 0.9438
Ratio of unhealthy commodities to output production x0/y0 0.0562
Ratio of physical capital to output production k0/y0 5.9712
Fraction of physical capital invested in the goods sector s0 0.9169
Fraction of labor supply invested in the goods sector v0 0.8790
With equations (2.2.9c) and (2.2.9h), h∗ can be presented as
h∗ =
µψ(1 + τc)c
∗
(1− l∗)(ρ+ δ) . (2.3.30)
With equation (2.3.30) and the steady state condition h˙ = 0, we rewrite equation
(2.2.5) as
η =
y∗
x∗
(
m∗
y∗
− µψ(1 + τc)c
∗
(1− l∗)(ρ+ δ)y∗
)
. (2.3.31)
This equation indicates that the determination of µ affects the value of η. For η to
be non-negative, the term in the brackets on the right-hand side has to be greater
than or equal to zero. Therefore,
µ ≤ µ¯ ≡ (1− l
∗)(ρ+ δ)m∗
δψ(1 + τc)c∗
. (2.3.32)
In our calibration, the upper limit µ¯ = 0.0936. In this paper, we select µ = 0.08 as
the benchmark. Consequently, the benchmark η is 0.3199 (from equation (2.3.31)),
and the initial h∗ is 2.4564 (from equation (2.3.30)). θ is calibrated as 0.0772 from
equation (2.2.9b). Furthermore, by using equations (2.2.2) and (3.2.6), we find that
A = 1.6493 and B = 2.0869. We further include the other two parameter sets:
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Table 2.3: Calibrated parameters
Parameters Parameter set 1 (benchmark) Parameter set 2 Parameter set 3
µ 0.0800 0.0936 0.0400
θ 0.0772 0.0595 0.1290
η 0.3199 0.0000 1.2599
A 1.6493 1.6185 1.7245
B 2.0869 2.0435 2.1931
It should be noted that the parameter set 2 is the extreme case where unhealthy
commodities do not exert any detrimental effect on health. The reason why we
include the parameter set 3 is to show the case where η is above 1.
2.3.2 Comparative-static analysis of changing τx alone
Figure 2.1 depicts the effects of implementing τx alone.
Figure 2.1: Comparative-static effects of implementing τx alone
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This figure presents the comparative-static effects of τx with the three parameter
sets listed in Table 2.3: (1) The solid curves denote the simulation results with the
benchmark parameter set; (2) the dashed curves denote the simulation results with
parameter set 2; and (3) the dash-dotted curves denote the simulation results with
parameter set 3.
We summarize the effects of implementing τx with lump-sum transfers in the
benchmark case as below:
Table 2.4: The comparative-static effects of τx with lump-sum transfers
c∗ x∗ l∗ s∗ k∗ h∗
τx + − − + − 0
The comprehensive comparative-static effects of the taxes are shown in Appendix
2.A.2.
Taking the derivative of equation (2.2.22) with respect to τx, we find that in-
creases in τx reduce x
∗. This result is in line with the intuition that higher prices
deter the consumption of x. Intuitively, since τx reduces x
∗, higher τx should be
beneficial to h∗. However, referring to equation (2.2.19), we find that increases in
τx do not improve h
∗. Although τx reduces the consumption of x, individuals have
to reduce the investment in the health sector in order to hold the steady state con-
dition in equation (2.2.5). The decreased investment in the health sector offsets the
positive force from the reduced x∗.
Figure 2.2 shows the effects of τx on m when other taxes are held constant.
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Figure 2.2: The effects of τx on m when other taxes are held constant
Figure 2.2 shows that, in the special case where µ = µ¯ ( parameter set 2), health
investment is basically fixed regardless of the changes in τx. However, when µ < µ¯
(parameter sets 1 and 3), individuals decrease m in response to the increases in τx.
To illustrate this reduction in m, we first examine the impacts of implementing τx
on labor supply lhµ and physical capital k. As shown in Table 2.4, increases in τx
result in the decreases in both the steady state labor supply and physical capital.
Moreover, with the benchmark parameter set (parameter set 1), the fractions of
inputs allocated to the health sector, (1 − s∗) and (1 − v∗), decrease in response
to the implementation of τx. Consequently, m decreases without ambiguity. This
simulation result accords to our Proposition 2.1.
Although the implementation of τx alone does not improve h
∗, we find that h∗
2.3. Policy analysis 32
can be affected by changes in τl and τk:
dh∗
dτl
=
∂h∗
∂τl
< 0, (2.3.33)
dh∗
dτk
=
∂h∗
∂τk
+
∂h∗
∂pm
∂pm
∂τk
< 0, (2.3.34)
where
∂h∗
∂τl
=
−h∗
(1− µ)(1− τl) < 0,
∂h∗
∂τk
=
−αh∗
(1− α)(1− µ)(1− τk) < 0,
∂h∗
∂pm
=
−h∗
(1− µ)pm < 0.
The direct effects of τl and τk on h
∗ are both negative. The reason is that increases in
τl or τk crowd out the resources available for the health sector directly. In addition,
τk affect h
∗ through the channel of pm. h∗ is decreasing in pm because higher
prices on health services discourage individuals from investing in health. Note that
∂pm/∂τk < 0 (see equation (2.2.20)). Consequently, τk have positive impacts on h
∗
through this indirect channel. Nevertheless, the direct effect of τk outweighs the
indirect effect, so increases in τk reduce h
∗. Therefore, h∗ could be improved more
effectively if the government can combine the implementation of τx with reductions
in income taxes.
2.3.3 Tax reform
We define the government budget F by transforming equation (2.2.7) into
F ≡ τkrk + τlwlhµ + τcc+ τxx−G = 0. (2.3.35)
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In our calibration, dF/dτk > 0, dF/dτl > 0, dF/dτx > 0, and dF/dτc > 0. According
to the implicit function theorem, we find dτk/dτx < 0 and dτl/dτx < 0 in our
model. These negative relationships suggest that the government can keep the
revenue constant by raising τx while reducing τl or τk. We propose two potential
tax reforms: first, the reform which raises τx while reducing τl; second, the reform
which raises τx while reducing τk. To calculate appropriate income tax rates, we
endogenize τl and τk in the computation. The changes in the two income taxes are
plotted in Figure 2.3.
Figure 2.3: The replacement of τl and τk with τx under revenue-neutral schemes
We then present the simulation results of the tax reforms in Figures 2.4 and 2.5.
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Figure 2.4: Tax reform of replacing τl with τx
Figure 2.5: Tax reform of replacing τk with τx
Figures 2.4 and 2.5 show that x∗ decreases in τx in both reforms. Decomposing
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the effects of τx on x
∗ in the tax reforms from equation (2.2.22), we find that
dx∗
dτx
=
∂x∗
∂τx
+
∂x∗
∂τi
dτi
dτx
, where i = l, k. (2.3.36)
where ∂x∗/∂τx < 0, ∂x∗/∂τl < 0, and ∂x∗/∂τk < 0. The above full derivative shows
that the negative relationship between τx and x
∗ is composed of two opposite effects:
the negative effect of τx and the positive effect through the channel of decreasing τl
or τk. The negative effect of τx can be examined from Table 2.4. To understand the
positive effects through the channels of decreasing income taxes, we note that any
changes in τl or τk which affects c
∗ would require adjustments in x∗ so as to restore
the marginal rate of substitution (MRS). Therefore, an increase in c∗ induced by
smaller τl would prompt individuals to raise x
∗; likewise, an increase in c∗ due to
smaller τk would also make individuals increase x
∗. However, with our calibration,
the positive effect always dominates the negative effects through income taxes in
both reforms.
It should be noted that h∗ increases in τx with both reforms. To understand the
mechanisms, we take full derivations of h∗ as below:
dh∗
dτx
=
∂h∗
∂τi
∂τi
∂τx
, (2.3.37)
where ∂h∗/∂τl < 0 and ∂h∗/∂τk < 0 as shown in Appendix 2.A.2. The overall
impacts of the tax reforms on h∗ are thus positive. It should be noted that these
increases in h∗ are not due to the reduced detrimental effects of decreased x∗, but
the indirect effects from the decreased τl or τk.
The effects of the tax reforms of replacing τl or τk with τx on c
∗ can be examined
through
dc∗
dτx
=
∂c∗
∂τx
+
∂c∗
∂τi
dτi
dτx
, (2.3.38)
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where ∂c∗/∂τx > 0, ∂c∗/∂τl < 0, and ∂c∗/∂τk < 0. Referring to equation (2.2.26),
higher τx contribute to a higher level of c
∗ through the channel of l∗. In addition to
this effect, increases in τx also affect c
∗ through the channel of decreasing τl or that of
τk with the reforms. To illustrate the channel of decreasing τl: a decrease in τl raises
the marginal cost of leisure (as shown in equation (2.2.9c)). Individuals are thus
encouraged to provide more labor supply, resulting in two opposing effects. First,
more labor supply contributes to a higher output in the goods sector. To clear the
goods market, the consumption of c∗ has to increase in the long run. Second, more
labor supply may lead to less leisure, so that individuals have to decrease c∗ to hold
the MRS constant. As shown in Figure 2.4, the negative effects are overshadowed by
the positive effects, resulting in the case where c∗ is increasing in τx. The channel
of decreasing τk can be examined from equation (2.2.9g): a decrease in τk raises
the after-tax marginal product of capital, so an increase in k∗ is needed to reduce
the pre-tax marginal product of capital. As a result, c∗ has to increase so that the
steady state condition for the resource constraint can be held.
To explain the impacts of the reforms on l∗, we take the full derivatives of l∗
with respect to τx
dl∗
dτx
=
∂l∗
∂τx
+
∂l∗
∂τi
dτi
dτx
, (2.3.39)
where ∂l∗/∂τx < 0, ∂l∗/∂τl < 0, and ∂l∗/∂τk < 0. The impacts of the tax reforms
on l∗ can be separated into: the negative direct effect of τx (see Figure 2.1), and
the positive indirect effect through decreased τl or τk. To understand the positive
indirect effect through τl: a decrease in τl raises the marginal cost of leisure (see
equation (2.2.9c)), so individuals would find it optimal to reduce leisure by increasing
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l∗. Our simulation result shows that, in the reform of replacing τl, the positive
indirect effect through decreasing τl dominates the negative direct effect of τx on
l∗. This combined effect overshadows the direct effect of τx, so l∗ increases as τx
increases under this reform. To understand the positive indirect effect through τk:,
the reduced τk encourages the accumulation of k
∗ and thus results in two opposing
effects. The first effect can be examined from equations (2.2.8) and (2.2.9c): a
higher level of k∗ results in a higher level of c∗. individuals have to decrease l∗
to maintain the MRS between consumption and leisure. The second effect can be
viewed from equation (2.2.17): smaller τk result in a lower labor-capital ratio. To
restore the labor-capital ratio, l∗ is required to increase. The positive indirect effect
is overshadowed by the combined negative effect, so l∗ decreases in the reform which
adjusts τk.
As shown in Figures 2.4 and 2.5, s∗ increases in both reforms. The full derivatives
of s∗ with respect to τx in the two tax reforms yield
ds∗
dτx
=
∂s∗
∂τx
+
∂s∗
∂τi
dτi
dτx
, (2.3.40)
where ∂s∗/∂τx > 0, ∂s∗/∂τl > 0, and ∂s∗/∂τk > 0. To understand the mechanisms
behind the changes in s∗, we decompose the effects of the reforms into two: the
direct effect of increasing τx and the indirect effect of decreasing τl or τk. We know
from Table 2.4 that the direct effect of increasing τx is positive on s
∗. To explain
the indirect effects from τl and τk, it is worth noting that decreases in either income
taxes encourage the accumulation of k as in equation (2.2.8). To maintain k˙ = 0 in
the steady state, individuals must shift the investment from the goods sector to the
health sector in response to both tax reforms. However, our simulation results show
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that the positive effect of τx dominates. Consequently, s
∗ (and hence v∗) increases
with the implementation of either reforms.
The comparative-static effects on k∗ with the two types of tax reforms can be
disentangled into two parts as below
dk∗
dτx
=
∂k∗
∂τx
+
∂k∗
∂l(h∗)µ
dl(h∗)µ
dτi
dτi
dτx
, (2.3.41)
where ∂k∗/∂τx < 0, ∂k∗/∂l∗(h∗)µ > 0, ∂l∗(h∗)µ/∂τl < 0, and ∂l∗(h∗)µ/∂τk < 0.
The two proposed tax reforms affect k∗ through two channels. The first channel is
through the crowding-out effect in the goods sector: increases in τx directly crowd
out the resource available for the accumulation of k (as in equation (2.2.8)). The
second channel is through the changes in labor supply: to hold the labor-capital
ratio constant in the steady state, k∗ has to increase (decrease) as l∗(h∗)µ increases
(decreases). Since the variations in h∗ were discussed with equations (2.3.33) and
(2.3.34) earlier, we focus on the analysis of the impacts of changes in l∗ on k∗. In the
tax reform where τl is replaced by τx, individuals find it optimal to raise l
∗. Following
this increase in l∗, k∗ has to increase in order to fix the labor-capital ratio. In the
reform with adjustments in τk, decreased τk encourages individuals to accumulate
more k. Accordingly, the effects through the channel of decreasing income taxes are
positive under both reforms. These positive effects dominate, so k∗ increases in τx
with either reform.
2.3.4 Welfare analysis
In this subsection, we simulate the effects on welfare in the economy by taking the
quantitative results of the tax reforms into the utility function (2.2.1). Moreover,
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we include the simulated effects of implementing τx alone as a comparison. We scale
up the utility levels in order to attain positive values. The changes in welfare are
plotted in Figure 2.6.
Figure 2.6: Changes in welfare in response to the implementation of the tax reforms
To better present the variations in welfare after implementing different policies,
we simulate the results from the initial calibration where τx = 0.08 in Figure 2.6.
The tax reform where τl is replaced by τx results in the decreases of both leisure
and x∗; nevertheless, due to its contribution to the increase in c∗, this tax reform
still contributes to better welfare in the long run. Compared to the former reform,
the replacement of τk with τx increase not only c
∗ but also leisure in the long run.
It should be noted that the implementation of τx alone reduces welfare in our cali-
bration. This finding implies that, compared to the taxing x alone, the reform with
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reduction in income taxes not only raise h but also welfare in the long run.
2.4 Conclusion
This paper provides a rigorous theoretical framework to explain the findings from the
epidemiological literature on population health: first, why taxes on unhealthy com-
modities alone might fail to improve population health, and second, why these taxes
are more likely to be beneficial to health when they are coupled with other fiscal in-
struments. In addition, we offer insights on how taxation of unhealthy commodities
affects the economy and overall welfare. For this purpose, we construct a dynamic
general equilibrium two-sector model with endogenous health. The two sectors em-
ployed in the model are the goods sector, which produces consumption commodities,
and the health sector, which provides individuals with health. Health not only raises
individual labor supply, but also increases the level of utility by enhancing leisure
time. Although unhealthy commodities provide individuals with utility, they pose
detrimental effects on health. Intuitively, taxes on unhealthy commodities should
directly improve health as long as the taxes are effective in reducing their consump-
tion. However, the steady state solutions show that, even though taxes on unhealthy
commodities decrease their consumption, they hardly improve the stock of health
in the long run. The reason is that, as detrimental effects decrease, individuals
would find it beneficial to reduce the investment in the health sector. Nevertheless,
with revenue-neutral adjustments of taxes on labor income or on capital income, the
implementation of taxes on unhealthy commodities can largely improve the level of
health through income effects. In addition, both tax reforms contribute to higher
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levels of welfare in the long run. The results offer important guidelines to policy
makers: the introduction of a tax on unhealthy commodities, for example a “sugar
tax”, should always be coupled with a reduction in other tax burdens in order to
improve the level of population health and increase overall welfare effectively.
2.A Appendix
2.A.1 Closed-form solutions
We obtain closed-form solutions of the parameterized model by rearranging equa-
tions (2.2.12), (2.2.16), (2.2.18), (2.2.26), (2.2.27), and (2.2.28):
c∗ =
(ω − (1− β)δpm)(1− τl)pih∗
(1− α)pi(1− τl) + [((1− β)ηθpm + θ(1− α))(1− τl) + piψ] (1− τc) ,
x∗ =
θ(1 + τc)
1 + τx + pmη
c∗,
l∗ =
(1− β)pm(δpiψ + ηθω(1− τl))(1 + τc) + (1− α)ω(1− τl)(pi + θ(1 + τc))
ω {[θ(1− α)(1− τl) + piψ + (1− β)ηθpm(1− τl)] (1 + τc) + pi(1− α)(1− τl)} ,
v∗ =
(1− α)(ω − (1− β)δpm)(1− τl)(pi + θ(1 + τc))
(1− β)pm(δpiψ + ηθω(1− τl))(1 + τc) + (1− α)ω(1− τl)(pi + θ(1 + τc)) ,
s∗ =
α(1− β)v∗
β(1− α) + (α− β)v∗ ,
h∗ =
(
αA(1− τk)
ρ
) α
(1−α)(1−µ)
(
µA(1− α)(1− τl)
pm(ρ+ δ)
) 1
1−µ
,
pm =
α
α(1−β)
1−α
ββ
(
1− α
1− β
)1−β (
A
1−β
1−α
B
)(
1− τk
ρ
)α−β
1−α
.
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2.A.2 Comparative-static effects of income taxes
Figure 2.A.1: Comparative-static effects of τl
Figure 2.A.2: Comparative-static effects of τk
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Table 2.A.1: Changes in tax rates with lump-sum transfers
c∗ x∗ l∗ s∗ k∗ h∗
τl − − − + − −
τk − − − + − −
τx + − − + − 0
2.A.3 Health sector with DRTS technologies
In addition to the benchmark case where m has CRTS, we analyze the case where
m has DRTS in this appendix. First of all, we transform equation (2.2.15) into the
following form:
m = B
[
((1− s)k)β ((1− v)lhµ)(1−β)
]γ
, (2.A.1)
where γ denotes the degree of returns to scale.
In addition to the empirical data used in Section 2.3, we choose γ as 0.8 in
accordance with Halliday et al. (2017). The new parameter sets for the DRTS case
can then be obtained. The calibrated parameters are presented in Table 2.A.2.
Table 2.A.2: Calibrated parameters with DRTS production in the health sector
Parameters Parameter set 1 Parameter set 2 Parameter set 3
µ 0.0800 0.0959 0.0400
θ 0.0797 0.0595 0.1302
η 0.3654 0.0000 1.2827
A 1.6235 1.5882 1.6963
B 1.3977 1.3706 1.4535
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It is worth noting that parameter set 2 is the extreme case where the consumption
of x does not pose any detrimental effect on health. With the calibrated parameters
listed in Table 2.A.2, we are able to analyze the impacts of implementing τx when
m has DRTS. The comparative-static effects of τx and those of the two tax reforms
(one adjusts τl in response to the changes in τx and the other one adjusts τk in
response to the changes in τx) are shown in the following figures. In terms of the
simulated results of the two tax reforms, we only present those with parameter set
1 for concision.
Figure 2.A.3 shows the changes in economic variables in response to the changes
in τx in the benchmark case with DRTS in the health sector. Figure 2.A.4 further
shows the impacts of τx on m. The effects of the two tax reforms are shown in
Figures 2.A.5 and 2.A.6.
Figure 2.A.3: The comparative-static effects of τx when m has DRTS
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Figure 2.A.4: The comparative-static effects of τx on m when m has DRTS
Figure 2.A.5: Tax reform of replacing τl with τx when m has DRTS
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Figure 2.A.6: Tax reform of replacing τk with τx when m has DRTS
In the cases where m has DRTS, the impacts of implementing τx alone on h
∗
are still limited (see Figure 2.A.3), because the beneficial effects of the taxes on h∗
could be offset by the simultaneous reduction in m (see Figure 2.A.4). Therefore,
our inference in the previous section hold even when the health sector has DRTS.
Moreover, the implementation of the policies present similar impacts on endogenous
variables. Therefore, our analysis in the previous sections hold even with the DRTS.
Chapter 3
Optimal sin taxes in the presence
of income taxes and health care
In this chapter, we take a non-paternalistic view to justify the role of sin taxes (taxes
on unhealthy commodities) in terms of externalities on public funds. The analytical
results in this chapter show the additive property between the Pigouvian and the
efficiency elements in optimal sin taxes. Although the Pigouvian element decreases
in the presence of income taxes, optimal sin taxes are not necessarily lower due to the
presence of the efficiency element in the second-best setting. The calibration results
in this chapter show that the implementation of sin taxes have double-dividends
which improve not only health but also economic performance as well as welfare in
the UK economy.
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3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we take a non-paternalistic view to justify the role of sin taxes (taxes
on unhealthy commodities such as cigarettes and alcohol) based on the fiscal exter-
nalities on public funds.1 Moreover, we explore the structure of optimal sin taxes in
the presence of income taxes and the provision of health care. The consumption of
sin goods poses detrimental effects on individual health. Although individuals can
replenish health through health care services, they may incur undesirable external-
ities on the fiscal budget if they do not fully internalize (1) the crowding-out effect
on health care resources while tackling short-term health problems (the short-term
externalities), and (2) the relationship between individuals’ long-term health and
the effectiveness of health care services (the long-term externalities).2
In Grossman (1972), health not only enhances utility but also individual “healthy
time” available for work. However, studies on sin taxes and health care generally
treat labor supply independent of health (e.g. Cremer et al., 2012). In this chapter,
we broaden the analysis to include the relationship between health and labor supply
by combining the preferences toward health and leisure. By doing so, we can include
1Studies of sin taxes usually apply the paternalistic view which focuses on the corrective property
of the taxes toward individual self-control problems or ignorance toward the detrimental impacts
of sin goods on health (e.g. Aronsson and Thunstro¨m, 2008; Cremer et al., 2012; Goulao and
Pe´rez-Barahona, 2014; O’Donoghue and Rabin, 2003, 2006).
2A large literature suggests that the marginal efficiency of health should decrease as the stock
of health increases. The subsequent implication is that marginal effects of health on the effective
health care should be set to values which make the rate of return decrease in health in the long
run. More discussion can be found in Section 3.2.
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the relationship between health and labor suggested in Burns and Mullahy (2016).
Moreover, we can thus examine how the presence of labor income taxes in the second-
best setting influences the structure of optimal sin taxes (Bovenberg and Goulder,
1996).
We approach the optimal taxation problem by taking the perspectives from both
individuals and the government. By decomposing the structure of optimal sin taxes,
we find that the additive property between the Pigouvian element and the efficiency
element proposed by Sandmo (1975) is retained in our model. The corrective role
of optimal sin taxes can be justified by both the short- and long-term externalities.
Moreover, we calibrate the model on the UK economy to obtain quantitative im-
plications for sin taxes. Our quantitative results show that, in line with Bovenberg
and Goulder (1996), the Pigouvian element is lower when the first-best policy is
unavailable in the economy. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the second-best
sin taxes are not necessarily lower than the first-best sin taxes due to the presence
of the efficiency element.
To further examine the property of sin taxes, we construct a revenue-neutral
“sin tax reform” which replaces labor income taxes with sin taxes. Our numerical
analysis shows that the implementation of sin taxes has double-dividends in terms of
not only improving population health but also enhancing both economic performance
and welfare.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 introduces an economy with
individuals who internalize the detrimental effects of sin goods on health but not
necessarily the extenalities on the fiscal budget. Section 3.3 formulates the optimiza-
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tion problem from the government’s perspective (the Ramsey problem) and presents
optimal taxes by comparing the optimal conditions from the two perspectives. Sec-
tion 3.4 decomposes the structure of optimal sin taxes and provides quantitative
implications regarding the properties of sin taxes. Section 3.5 shows the simulation
results with revenue-neutral sin tax reforms, which further address the role of sin
taxes in the economy. Conclusions are offered in Section 4.5.
3.2 The economy
The individual objective is to maximize the lifetime utility.
U =
∫ ∞
0
e−ρtu(c, x, L)dt, (3.2.1)
where ρ denotes the rate of time preference, c denotes numeraire goods, x denotes
sin goods, and L denotes leisure. L can be specified as
L ≡ (1− l)H(h), (3.2.2)
where l is the fraction of healthy time allocated to labor supply, and h is the stock
of health. h generates healthy time through the H function, which is assumed to be
concave as in Grossman (1972).3 The objective function is subject to the constraint
of asset a and the law of motion of h:
a˙ = (1− τk)ra+ (1− τl)wlH − c− (1 + τx)x− T, (3.2.3)
3In Grossman (1972), individual time can be separated into two: sick time and healthy time.
Individuals are only able to work during healthy time. Moreover, as in Hokayem and Ziliak (2014),
we further assume that individuals can also enjoy leisure while being healthy.
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h˙ = M(m, xx, hh)− η(x)− δh, (3.2.4)
where
Mm > 0, Mx ≤ 0, ηx > 0, ηxx ≤ 0, δ > 0.
In equation (3.2.3), τk, τl, and τx represent taxes on capital income, labor income,
and sin goods respectively. r and w represent the factor prices of capital and labor,
and T represents lump-sum taxes. For simplicity, we normalize the after-tax price of
c into unity without affecting the results of this chapter. Equation (3.2.4) shows that
the stock of health can be accumulated through effective health care M and deterio-
rated with x via the η function and the natural depreciation δ. M is affected by the
provision of public health care m,4 individual consumption of x, and the individual
level of h. The inclusion of x and h captures the short- and long-term externalities
on M . To understand the short-term externalities on M : although individuals can
use m to recover from short-term problems caused by x, they simultaneously crowd
out the resources available for other health problems and the opportunities to fur-
ther improve h. Therefore, Mx ≤ 0. To understand the long-term externalities on
M : with given m, the marginal efficiency of h decreases as individuals increase their
own health (e.g. Galama et al., 2012; Galama and Van Kippersluis, 2018; Grossman,
1972). The implication for our model would then be dh˙/dh < 0. Hence, Mh can
be either positive or negative as long as it is less than δ. To model the internal-
ization of the short- and long-term externalities, we include x and h to represent
4It should be noted that the provision of m is exogenous from an individual perspective. How-
ever, it would be endogenous if we take the perspective from the government.
3.2. The economy 52
individual degrees of internalization of Mx and Mh respectively. It should be noted
that 0 ≤ x ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ h ≤ 1. The extreme case where h = x = 1 indicates
that individuals fully internalize the effects of x and h on M ; on the other hand, the
other extreme case where x = h = 0 indicates that individuals completely ignore
the two effects.
The economy is constituted by two sectors: the goods sector y and the health
sector m. Both sectors require capital k and labor supply lH as inputs.
y =f(sk, vlH), (3.2.5)
m =m((1− s)k, (1− v)lH), (3.2.6)
where s and v are the fractions of capital and labor supply devoted into the goods
sector. The efficiency condition of the goods market implies r = f1 and w = f2,
where fi denotes the derivative of production functions f with the ith argument.
The government collects tax revenue to finance m as below:
τkra+ τlwlH + τxx+ T + b˙ = m+ rb, (3.2.7)
where b is the government debt.
The Hamiltonian function for the individual maximization problem is formulated
as
H = u(c, x, L) + λ[(1− τk)ra+ (1− τl)wlH − c− (1 + τx)x− T ]
+ q[M(m, xx, hh)− η(x)− δh],
where λ and q are the co-state variables. The first-order conditions are
uc = λ, (3.2.8a)
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ux = λ(1 + τx)− q (Mxx − ηx) , (3.2.8b)
uL = λ(1− τl)w, (3.2.8c)
λ(1− τk)r = ρλ− λ˙, (3.2.8d)
uL(1− l)Hh + λ(1− τl)wlHh + q(Mhh − δ) = ρq − q˙, (3.2.8e)
With equation (3.2.8c), equation (3.2.8e) can be
q˙ = q(ρ+ δ −Mhh)− uLHh. (3.2.9)
3.3 The Ramsey problem
We employ the primal approach, which enables us to maximize the social welfare
directly through choices of allocations (see Atkinson and Stiglitz (2015)). The im-
plementability constraint can be obtained through equations (3.2.3) and (3.2.8d)
λ0a0 =
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt[ucc− uLlH + uxx+ q(Mxx − ηx)x+ ucT ]dt. (3.3.10)
With equations (3.2.3) and (3.2.7), we derive the feasibility constraint as
k˙ = f(sk, vlH)− c− x. (3.3.11)
The constraint for h from the government’s perspective is specified as
h˙ = M(m((1− s)k, (1− v)lH), x, h)− η(x)− δh. (3.3.12)
We then formulate the Hamiltonian function as
Hg = u+ Ω[λ0a0] + γ[k˙] + ω[h˙] + ψ[q˙] + ν[m− m¯],
= u+ Ω [ucc− uLlH + uxx+ q(Mxx − ηx)x+ ucT + uc0a0]
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+ γ [f(sk, vlH)− c− x]
+ ω [M(m((1− s)k, (1− v)lH), x, h)− η(x)− δh]
+ ψ [q(ρ+ δ −Mhh)− uLHh] ,
+ ν[m− m¯],
where Ω, γ, ω, ψ, and ν are the co-state variables, and m¯ indicates the required
level of spending on m.
The first-order conditions can be written as below.5
γ
uc
= 1 + Ω∆c − ucL
uc
ψHh, (3.3.13a)
γ
ux
= 1 + Ω∆x + Ω
q
ux
[Mxx − ηx + (Mxxx − ηxx)x] + ω
ux
(Mx − ηx)
− ψ
ux
(qMxhh + uxLHh),
(3.3.13b)
γf2
uL
= 1 + Ω∆L − uLL
uL
ψHh, (3.3.13c)
γ˙ = γ(ρ− f1), (3.3.13d)
ψ˙ = ψ(Mhh − δ)− Ω (Mxx − ηx)x, (3.3.13e)
ω˙ = ω(ρ+ δ −Mh)− uLHh [1 + Ω (∆L − 1)]− ΩqMxhxx
+ ψ
[
qMhhh + uLHhh + uLLH
2
h
]
,
(3.3.13f)
where
∆c ≡ 1 + ucc
uc
c− ucL
uc
lH +
ucx
uc
x+
ucc
uc
T, (3.3.14)
∆x ≡ 1 + ucx
ux
c− uxL
ux
lH +
uxx
ux
x+
ucx
ux
T, (3.3.15)
5The detailed derivation can be found in Appendix 3.A.1.
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∆L ≡ 1 + ucL
uL
c− uLL
uL
lH +
uxL
uL
x+
ucL
uL
T. (3.3.16)
To derive optimal taxes, we compare marginal rates of substitution (MRS) de-
rived from the individual problem and those from the Ramsey problem. The optimal
taxes are
τl =
uL
γf2
[
Ω (∆L −∆c) + ψHh
(
ucL
uc
− uLL
uL
)]
, (3.3.17)
τx =
q
uc
(Mxx − ηx) + ux
γ
{
Ω
[
∆c −∆x − q
ux
(Mxx − ηx + (Mxxx
−ηxx)x)]− ω
ux
(Mx − ηx) + ψ
(
q
ux
Mxhh +
(
uxL
ux
− ucL
uc
)
Hh
)}
.
(3.3.18)
In the steady state, q˙ = γ˙ = ψ˙ = ω˙ = 0. Accordingly, equations (3.2.9),
(3.3.13d), (3.3.13f), and (3.3.13e) imply that, in the steady state,
q =
uLHh
ρ+ δ −Mhh , (3.3.19)
τk = 0, (3.3.20)
ψ =
Ω (Mxx − ηx)x
Mhh − δ , (3.3.21)
ω =
1
ρ+ δ −Mh
{
uLHh [1 + Ω (∆L − 1)] + ΩqMxhxx− ψ
[
qMhhh
+ uLHhh + uLLH
2
h
]}
.
(3.3.22)
The government can directly control quantities when the first-best policy T is im-
plementable. In this case, the implementability constraint is nonbinding and thus
Ω = ψ = 0. Referring to equation (3.3.17), the implementation of τl is only justifi-
able in the second-best setting. On the other hand, optimal τx are not necessarily
zero in the first-best setting. A further exploration of the structure of τx will be
provided in Section 3.4.
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3.4 Optimal sin taxes
Sandmo (1975) finds that the optimal tax on an externality-generating commodity
can be decomposed into the Pigouvian element and the efficiency element additively.
The Pigouvian element counteracts externalities, and the efficiency element satisfies
the government revenue requirements under the efficiency principles of taxation. In
line with this finding, we find that the optimal sin taxes can be written in the form
of
τx = τ
p
x + τ
e
x , (3.4.23)
where
τ px =
uL
uc
× Hh
(ρ+ δ −Mhh) (ρ+ δ −Mh) [−Mx(ρ+ δ)(1− x)
+Mhηx(1− h) +MxMh(h − x)],
(3.4.24)
and
τ ex =
Mx − ηx
γ
[
uLHh
ρ+ δ −Mh
(
γ
uc
− 1
)
− ω + uLHh
ρ+ δ −Mh
]
+
ux
γ
{
Ω
[
∆c −∆x − q
ux
(Mxx − ηx + (Mxxx − ηxx)x)
]
+ ψ
[
q
ux
Mxhh +
(
uxL
ux
− ucL
uc
)
Hh
]}
.
(3.4.25)
τ px denotes the Pigouvian element which corrects both the short- and long-term
externalities when either x or h is not zero, and τ
e
x denotes the efficiency element
when the first-best policy T is not available in the economy. Referring to equation
(3.3.21), it is clear that τ ex is zero in the first-best setting. The observation regarding
equation (3.4.23) leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 3.1. The structure of optimal sin taxes can be decomposed into the
Pigouvian element and the efficiency element additively. The Pigouvian element is
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zero when individuals fully internalize both the short- and long-term externalities.
The efficiency element is present only when the first-best policy is not implementable.
The additive property between τ px and τ
e
x as suggested in Sandmo (1975) is also
found in our dynamic setting. Even in the first-best setting, τ px could be non-zero
when either x or h is below unity. This observation justifies the corrective role of
τx when individuals do not fully internalize the short or long-term externalities (or
both) on M . We quantify the model with the parameters and variables listed below.
Table 3.1: Benchmark parameters
Benchmark parameters and observables
Share of physical capital in the goods sector α 0.3
Share of physical capital in the health sector β 0.22
Relative productivity in the goods sector A 1.5
Effects of health care spending on effective health care κm 0.8
Effects of short-tern externalities on effective health care κx 0.2
Effects of long-term externalities on effective health care κh 0.4
Production efficiency of healthy time µ 0.08
Initial production in the goods sector y0 1
Rate of time preference ρ 0.04
Ratio of numeraire commodities to output production c0/y0 0.9560
Ratio of sin goods to output production x0/y0 0.0440
Natural depreciation of health δ 0.043
Capital income taxes τk 0.29
Labor income taxes τl 0.26
Sin taxes τx 0.16
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The calibrated results are presented in Table 3.2. Detailed calibration can be found
in Appendix 3.A.2.
Table 3.2: Calibration
Calibration
Ratio of physical capital to output production k0/y0 5.7112
Ratio of health capital to output production h0/y0 11.4235
Fraction of physical capital invested in the goods sector s0 0.9324
Fraction of labor supply invested in the goods sector v0 0.9007
Relative preference to sin goods θ 0.1057
Relative preference to leisure ψ 2.4977
Detrimental effects of sin goods η 6.5121
Relative productivity in the health sector B 1.8715
Figure 3.1: The first- and second-best τ px when x = h = 0 with different levels of
m¯
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Figure 3.1 shows the first- and the second-best Pigouvian elements in the presence
of different levels of m¯. For the conciseness of the chapter, we focus on the benchmark
case with x = h = 0 in this section. The analysis of other cases is provided in
Appendix 3.A.3. The solid line represented changes in the first-best τ px , and the
dotted line represents the changes in the second-best τ px . This figure clearly shows
that, τ px in the second-best setting are generally lower than those in the first-best
setting. The reason behind the lower τ px is that individuals can tolerate higher levels
of externalities because they value public goods less in the presence of τl. This
finding accords to Bovenberg and Goulder (1996) in that the implementation of
income taxes distorts the corrective taxes downward. However, it should be noted
that lower Pigouvian elements in the second-best setting do not imply lower τx in
the second-best setting as well.
Figure 3.2: The first- and second-best τx when x = h = 0 with different levels of
m¯
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Figure 3.2 shows the overall first- and second-best τx when x = h = 0 with
our benchmark parameters. Referring to equation (3.4.25), the efficiency element
could be non-zero in the second-best setting. Therefore, even though the Pigouvian
element is lower in the presence of τl, the second-best τx can still be higher due to
the presence of the efficiency element.
3.5 Sin tax reform
In this section, we characterize the impacts of sin taxes by simulating changes in
economic variables in response to a revenue-neutral “sin tax reform” which replaces
τl with τx.
Figure 3.3: The economic impacts of a sin tax reform
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Figure 3.3 shows the changes in h, y and U in response to the increases in τx
with the sin tax reform. By observing the quantitative results, we find that this
revenue-neutral reform has the double-dividends which improve not only health but
also economic output in the goods sector and welfare of the economy.
The concept of double-dividends is often used in environmental economics to
point out that environmental taxes are beneficial not only to the environment but
also to economic efficiency (e.g. Bovenberg and De Mooij, 1994; Goulder, 1995). As
in Wang et al. (2017), the promotion of health can be achieved by using the revenue
from τx to cut discretionary taxes. In this chapter, less costly m can be achieved by
utilizing the revenue from τx to reduce the distortion from τl. To understand the
benefits on y and U : as τl decrease in our sin tax reform, the resulting increases
in the after-tax labor income further boost the steady state labor supply (as in
equation (3.2.8c)). This increase eventually improves the economic performance in
the goods sector and thus the consumption of c in the long run.
3.6 Conclusion
This chapter explores the structure of optimal sin taxes in the presence of income
taxes and the provision of health care in a dynamic general equilibrium model. We
contribute to the literature of sin taxes with the following findings. First, we justify
the role of sin taxes in terms of the short- and long-term externalities on public funds.
Second, we show that the additive property between the Pigouvian element and the
efficiency element in the optimal sin taxes is retained in our dynamic setting. In
addition, our simulation shows that the second-best Pigouvian taxes are distorted
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downward by the implementation of labor income taxes. The reason behind this
finding is that individuals can tolerate more externalities since they value public
goods less in the second-best setting. However, with the presence of the efficiency
element, optimal sin taxes in the second-best setting are not necessarily lower than
those in the first-best setting. Third, we find that the implementation of sin taxes
has double-dividends in terms of not only improving population health but also
enhancing economic performance and welfare in the UK economy.
3.A Appendix
3.A.1 Optimal conditions of the Ramsey problem
As shown in Section 3.3, the Ramsey problem is
Hg = u+ Ω[λ0a0] + γ[k˙] + ω[h˙] + ψ[q˙] + ν[m− m¯],
= u+ Ω [ucc− uLlH + uxx+ q(Mxx − ηx)x+ ucT + uc0a0]
+ γ [f(sk, vlH)− c− x]
+ ω [M(m((1− s)k, (1− v)lH), x, h)− η(x)− δh]
+ ψ [q(ρ+ δ −Mhh)− uLHh] ,
+ ν[m− m¯].
The first-order conditions with respect to c, x, L, s, v, k, and q are then
uc + Ω [uc + uccc− ucLlH + ucxx+ uccT ] = γ + ψucLHh, (3.A.1a)
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ux + Ω [ucxc− uxLlH + ux + uxxx+ q (Mxx − ηx) + q (Mxxx − ηxx)x
+ucxT ] = γ − ω (Mx − ηx) + ψ (qMxhh + uxLHh) ,
(3.A.1b)
uL + Ω [ucLc− uLLlH + uL + uxLx− qMmxxm2(1− v)x+ ucLT ]
= γf2v + ωMmm2(1− v) + ψ (−qMmhh(1− v) + uLLHh)
+ νm2(1− v),
(3.A.1c)
γf1 = m1 [ΩqMmxxx+ ωMm − ψqMmhh + ν] , (3.A.1d)
γf2 = m2 [ΩqMmxxx+ ωMm − ψqMmhh + ν] , (3.A.1e)
ΩqMmx− xxm1(1− s) + ωMmm1(1− s)− ψqmmhhm1(1− s) + γf1s
+ νm1(1− s) = ργ − γ˙,
(3.A.1f)
Ω (Mxx − ηx)x+ ψ (ρ+ δ −Mhh) = ρψ − ψ˙. (3.A.1g)
With equations (3.A.1d) and (3.A.1e), equations (3.A.1c), (3.A.1f), and (3.A.1g)
can be rewritten into the forms of equations (3.3.13c), (3.3.13d), and (3.3.13f).
3.A.2 Calibration
To calibrate the model, we employ the following functions:
u = ln c+ θ lnx+ φ lnL, (3.A.2)
H = hµ, (3.A.3)
f = A(sk)α(vlH)(1−α), (3.A.4)
m = B((1− s)k)β((1− v)lH)1−β, (3.A.5)
M = mκmx−κxhκh . (3.A.6)
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We calibrate the model on the UK economy 2005-2015. The parameters are calcu-
lated by using the optimal conditions of the household problem. κm is calibrated as
0.8 following Halliday et al. (2017). δ is calibrated as 0.43 in line with Rockwood
and Mitnitski (2007). We set that τx = 0.16, τl = 0.26, and τk = 0.29 in accordance
with the updated data set of McDaniel (2007). We further choose that ρ = 0.04,
l = 0.25, α = 0.3, β = 0.22, and µ = 0.08 as in Wang et al. (2017). We take
κx = 0.2, κh = 0.4, A = 1.5, and x = h = 0 as the benchmark calibration.
The OECD stats shows that the average health spending as a share of GDP
in the UK from 2005-2015 is around 0.09. Accordingly, we set that m0
y0+m0
= 9%.6
Assuming y0 = 1, we further obtain m = 0.0989. Observing that the share household
spending on alcohol and tobacco being 4% and debt to GDP ratio being 7.7%, we
find that x0 = 0.044 and b0 = 0.8462. With the market clearing condition y = c+x,
we calculate that the c0 = 0.9560.
With the efficiency condition of equalizing the marginal productions of k and lH
across two sectors, we calculate that
s0 =
αy0
αy0 + βm0
= 0.9324, (3.A.7)
and that
v0 =
(1− α)y0
(1− α)y0 + (1− β)m0 = 0.9007. (3.A.8)
With equations (3.2.8c) and (3.2.8a), we are able to calibrate that
φ =
y0(1− l0)(1− τl)(1− α)
c0l0
= 1.6254. (3.A.9)
6Variables with a subscript 0 denotes the initial variables in our calibration hereafter.
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From equation (3.2.8d), the initial k is calibrated as
k0 =
(1− τk)αy0
s0ρ
= 5.7112. (3.A.10)
With the specific function of y, we obtain the initial h:
h0 =
{
A
−1
1−α
v0l0
[
m0
((1− s0)k0)β
] 1
1−α
} 1
µ
= 11.4235. (3.A.11)
With this initial h, we can use the m function to obtain B:
B =
m0
((1− s0)k0)β
[
1
(1− v0)l0hµ0
]1−β
= 1.8715. (3.A.12)
In the steady state, h˙ = 0. Accordingly,
η =
M0 − δh0
x0
= 6.5121. (3.A.13)
Referring to (3.2.8b), we find that
θ =
x0
c0
(1 + τx) + q0κxM0x + q0ηx0 = 0.1057. (3.A.14)
With the parameters and initial values calculated above, we then calibrate Ω =
0.3585 by using equations (3.3.13a), (3.3.13b), and (3.3.13c).
3.A.3 Sensitivity analysis
In this appendix, we compare the simulation results with different parameter com-
binations.
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Figure 3.A.1: The first- and second-best τ px with different x and h
Figure 3.A.2: The first- and second-best τx with different x and h
Figures 3.A.1 and 3.A.2 show the Pigouvian elements and optimal sin taxes
with different levels of internalization of externalities on effective health care. As
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discussed in Section 3.4, τ px are lower in the presence of income taxes because in-
dividuals can tolerate more externalities in the second-best economy. However, as
shown in Figure 3.2, the second-best τx can be higher than the first-best τx due to
the presence of τ ex . The extreme case of x = h = 1 indicates an economy where
individuals internalize both the short- and long-term externalities perfectly. Refer-
ring to equation (3.4.24), the Pigouvian element and thus the first-best sin taxes are
then zero. τ ex is the only component in the second-best τx in this case.
Figures 3.A.3 and 3.A.4 present the case where κh < 0. As discussed in Section
3.2, κh can be set with a negative value as long as Mh < δ.
7
Figure 3.A.3: The first- and second-best τ px with different x and h when κh < 0
7In this Appendix, we use κh = −0.2 as an example.
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Figure 3.A.4: The first- and second-best τx with different x and h when κh < 0
Referring to equation (3.4.24), τ px can be negative when Mh < 0. In this case, a
higher level of h is detrimental to the effectiveness of health care services. As shown
in Figures 3.A.3 and 3.A.4, instead of implementing taxes on x, the government may
have to subsidize on x to lower the accumulation of h. This special case shows the
difference between paternalistic and non-paternalistic approach to optimal taxation:
A paternalistic government may discourage individuals from consuming x due to the
detrimental effects of x on h; on the other hand, a non-paternalistic government may
encourage individuals to consume more x since it recognizes the fact that individuals
derive utility from x.
Chapter 4
Labor supply and endogenous
lifetime
In this chapter, we analyze the relationship between labor supply and public health
care in a two-period model with endogenous survival probabilities. With higher
survival probabilities, individuals generally offer more labor supply during old age.
However, if the additional spending on health care is funded through taxes on old-
age labor income, individuals would work more during young age but less as they
reach old age. In the face of improvements in production technologies, individuals
increase labor supply in both young and old age. On the other hand, in the face
of improvements in medical technologies, individuals offer more labor supply during
old age but less when they are young. These changes in labor choices result in lower
survival probabilities in the economy. Furthermore, we discover that optimal taxes
on labor supply depend on the coefficients of relative risk aversion with respect to
labor and consumption.
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4.1 Introduction
Most modern countries have witnessed a continuous increase in life expectancy over
the past two centuries. In addition to the advance in medical sciences, the growing
spending on health is usually regarded as the main source for the steady increase
in life expectancy (e.g. Brown, 2014; Costa, 2015; Lichtenberg, 2004; Lubitz et al.,
2003). Endogenizing decisions about health has consequently become one of the
main strands in the research of health policies (e.g. Chakraborty, 2004; Hall and
Jones, 2007). In response to the changes in health policies, individuals may alter
their intertemporal decisions on consumption and labor supply. These changes have
important implications for policy makers.
Figure 4.1 depicts the number of male survivors in England and Wales from 1850
to 2010, and Figure 4.2 plots the number of deaths across all age from 1850 to 2010
(Sources: Office for National Statistics (2012)).
Figure 4.1: Number of male survivors in England and Wales across all ages
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Figure 4.2: Number of male deaths by age in England and Wales across all ages
In line with the observation of Cervellati and Sunde (2013), we do not detect
major changes in the maximal life expectancy in Figures 4.1 and 4.2 even with
advances in medical research during the past two centuries. Instead, the documented
increases in life expectancy are mainly driven by increases in survivors within the
working population. As shown in Bo¨rsch-Supan et al. (2014), increasing the number
of survivors in the working population could have large impacts on the economy if
the effects of individual behaviors are included in the model. Acemoglu and Restrepo
(2017) also point out that an aging society does not necessarily imply a poor economy
if we consider the contribution of old-age labor supply. Therefore, it is possible
to benefit the economy with more provision of health care which raises survival
probabilities within the working population. However, the government would have
to impose more taxes to sustain additional provision of health care. This additional
reliance on taxes (especially on income taxes) might discourage labor supply.
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In this chapter, we explore the relationship between public policies and labor
supply with the consideration of endogenous lifetime. We extend the basic model of
Fleurbaey et al. (2016) and Leroux and Ponthiere (2018) by endogenizing individual
survival probabilities and including the role of taxes in the economy.1 In this chapter,
survival probabilities depend on a government’s provision of health care. we discover
that spending on health care generally encourages labor supply during old age.
Nevertheless, if the spending is funded mainly through taxes on old-age labor income,
it would discourage individuals from supplying labor in later life. In addition to the
analysis of the impacts of policies, we examine the impacts of changes in production
and medical technologies respectively. We find that improvements in production
technologies encourage labor supply during both young and old age; on the other
hand, improvements in medical technologies may encourage labor supply in young
age but not in old age. Furthermore, we derive optimal taxes from a welfarist
perspective. We find that these optimal taxes depend on the coefficients of relative
risk aversion regarding consumption and labor supply.
A road map of this chapter is as follows. A two-period model with endogenous
survival probabilities is constructed in Section 4.2. The equilibrium conditions of
the model are derived in Section 4.3. To obtain quantitative implications for the
1Both papers focus on the comparison between “ex ante egalitarianism”, where the social plan-
ner looks at the level of expected lifetime utilities, and “ex post egalitarianism”, where the social
planner looks at the final distribution of the realized utilities. Their results suggest that, under ex
post egalitarianism, a higher level of consumption in the first period is required to compensate the
premature dead. We do not focus on the comparison between different forms of egalitarianism, so
we will not discuss this issue any further.
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economy, we calibrate the model by using the empirical data of the UK. In addition
to the analysis around the impacts of taxes on the economy, we also derive optimal
taxes in Section 4.4. A conclusion is provided in Section 4.5.
4.2 The model
In this section, we develop a two-period model for a small open economy with the
spending on public health care, h. The duration of each period is normalized to
unity. In the first period, individuals work for l ∈ [0, 1] units of time with the wage
rate w. In the second period, individuals work for z ∈ [0, 1] units of time with the
wage rate δw, where δ ≤ 1 denotes the depreciation in labor productivity during old
age. Depending on survival probabilities pi, individuals can live either one or two
periods. Survival probabilities pi can be improved with the spending on h.
For simplicity, we assume additive separability in individual lifetime utility. The
forms of individual preferences toward consumption and leisure are identical across
the two periods. Consequently, the lifetime utility can be presented as
u(c)− v(l) + pi(h)[u(d)− v(z)], (4.2.1)
where c is the consumption in the first period and d is the consumption in the second
period. The utility obtained from consumption satisfies u′(·) > 0 and u′′(·) < 0. The
disutility parts in equation (4.2.1) are increasing and convex: v′(·) > 0 and v′′(·) > 0.
The function of survival probabilities pi is assumed to satisfy pi′(h) > 0 and pi′′(h) < 0
(as in Chakraborty, 2004; Da´vila and Leroux, 2015; Leroux et al., 2011b).
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The budget constraint in the first period is
c+ s+ b = (1− τl)wl, (4.2.2)
where s denotes saving, b denotes debts, and τl denotes taxes on labor income in the
first period. The inclusion of b in the first period allows us to analyze the relationship
between h and labor income taxes in the second period. The rationale behind this
inclusion is that the government can issue b in the first period to balance taxes in
the second period.
Let a ≡ s+ b denotes the total assets in the first period. The budget constraint
in the second period is therefore
d =
R¯
pi
a+ (1− τz)δwz, (4.2.3)
where
R¯ ≡ (1− τk)R.
In the above equation, R denotes the rate of returns on assets, τz denotes taxes
on labor income in the second period, and τk denotes taxes on these returns. In
the second period, individuals earn (or lose) from s, b and labor supply z with
depreciated labor productivity δw.
The lifetime budget constraint is thus
(1− τl)wl − c+ pi
R¯
(1− τz)δwz − pi
R¯
d = 0. (4.2.4)
To finance the spending on h, the government collects taxes from labor income
and returns on asset a. For simplicity, we assume the before-tax returns R = 1
hereafter without loss of generality. Therefore,
h = τlwl + τzpiδwz + τka, (4.2.5)
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4.3 The equilibrium
Individuals maximize the lifetime utility (4.2.1) subject to budget constraints (4.2.2)
and (4.2.3). The Lagrangian function is therefore
L = u(c)−v(l)+pi [u(d)− v(z)]+λ
[
(1− τl)wl − c+ pi
R¯
(1− τz)δwz − pi
R¯
d
]
. (4.3.6)
The first-order conditions are
uc = λ, (4.3.7)
ud =
λ
R¯
, (4.3.8)
vl = λ(1− τl)w, (4.3.9)
vz =
λ
R¯
(1− τz)δw, (4.3.10)
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the lifetime budget constraint.
4.3.1 The effects of the taxes
In this subsection, we explore the impacts of adjusting τl, τz, and τk on the economy.
We derive the variations in each endogenous variables by using the government
budget constraint, the individual budget constraint, and the first-order conditions.2
To obtain quantitative results, we calibrate the model on the UK economy with the
parameters listed in Table 4.1. The detailed illustration of the calibration can be
found in Appendix 4.A.2.
2The full derivation can be found in Appendix 4.A.1.
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Table 4.1: Benchmark parameters and calibration
Benchmark parameters and calibration
Utility weight of consumption T1 52
Utility weight of labor supply T2 47
Coefficient of relative risk aversion γ 1.5
Labor income taxes in the first period τl 0.26
Labor income taxes in the second period τz 0.26
Capital income taxes τk 0.29
Depreciation in productivity δ 1
Wage rate w 10
Consumption in the first period c 1
Labor supply in the first period l 0.25
Life expectancy Life Expectancy 81.40
Calibration
Asset accumulated in the first period a 0.85
Consumption in the second period d 0.7959
Labor supply in the second period z 0.0475
Survival probabilities pi 0.4729
Utility measure of labor supply α 32.7489
Spending on health care h 0.8973
We then apply the calibrated results to simulate the changes in economy in
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response to the changes in policies. Figure 4.3 shows the impacts of adjusting τl
from 0% to 100% on the economy.
Figure 4.3: The impacts of adjusting τl
Referring to equation (4.3.9), increases in τl raise the marginal costs of labor sup-
ply during young age. These higher costs discourage l. In response to the reduction
in l, individuals have to decrease c so that the first-period budget constraint can be
held. Consequently, individuals have to decrease d so that the MRS between c and
d can be restored. The bottom-left panel in Figure 4.3 presents a Laffer curve where
the government spending on h increases until τl reach a certain level. Therefore,
the implementation of higher τl could increase the provision of public health care as
long as τl are kept on the left-hand side of the Laffer curve. With the subsequent
higher survival probabilities, individuals have to supply more z to compensate the
resulting loss from the rate of returns (see equation (4.2.3)).
Figure 4.4 shows the impacts of adjusting τz on economic variables.
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Figure 4.4: The impacts of adjusting τz
As indicated by equation (4.3.10), marginal costs of labor supply during old
age increase with higher τz. Individuals hence supply less z in response to higher
τz. As implied in equation (4.2.3), d decreases in response to the reduction in the
after-tax labor income. A reduction in c is required so that the MRS between c
and d can be restored (see equations (4.3.7) and (4.3.8)). To explain the increases
in l: the implementation of higher τz can be viewed as a higher debt in the first
period. Therefore, given τl and w, individuals have to work more during young
age to equalize both sides of equation (4.2.2). The bottom two panels in Figure
4.5 indicate that survival probabilities could be raised with the implementation of
higher τz as long as the taxes are keep at the left-hand side of the Laffer curve.
Figure 4.5 shows the effects of increasing τk on economic variables.
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Figure 4.5: The impacts of adjusting τk
As shown in the second-period budget constraint (4.2.3), with a > 0 in our
calibration, higher τk reduce the rate of returns and therefore the consumption of d.
Referring to equation (4.2.2), individuals would rather consume more than save in
young age since savings become less valuable. z increases because individuals have
to work more to compensate the loss of returns on assets from higher τk. To sustain
the MRS between l and z, individuals have to reduce l. The bottom two panels in
figure 4.5 show that, as long as τk are kept on the left-hand side of the Laffer curve,
increases in τk could raise h and thus pi.
Our analysis shows that additional spending on health care can improve survival
probabilities as long as taxes are kept on the increasing part of the Laffer curve.
In the face of increases in lifetime, individuals generally increase labor supply in
old age. However, if the additional h is funded by τz, individuals would work more
during young age but less as they reach old age.
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4.3.2 The effects of changes in technologies
In this subsection, we investigate the impacts of changes in production technologies
and medical technologies respectively.
We simulate the impacts of positive technology shocks on this small open econ-
omy by raising the level of w from 0 to 100. The rationale behind this simulation
is that the improvements in production technologies enhance the levels of labor
productivity in both young and old age; these changes in labor productivity would
reflect on the level of wage rates in equilibrium. In our analysis, R is not affected by
the technology shocks in this small open economy because it is internationally de-
termined. The economic impacts of changes in production technologies are depicted
in Figure 4.6.
Figure 4.6: The impacts of improving production technologies
As shown in Figure 4.6, both c and d increase in response to the increases in w.
This co-movement can be examined from equations (4.2.2) and (4.2.3). Increases
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in w also raise the marginal returns on labor supply in both young and old age.
Therefore, individuals are encouraged to raise both l and z in equilibrium (see
equations (4.3.9) and (4.3.10)). In our calibration, the government consequently
collects more revenue for h from the given tax scheme. Therefore, h and pi increase
in response to the increases in w.
We then examine the impacts of variations in medical technologies, which are
embodied in the changes of δ. The intuition is that medical technologies could
restore the loss in labor productivity from aging. We simulate these impacts by
changing the value of δ from 0 to 1. The simulated results are plotted in Figure 4.7.
Figure 4.7: The impacts of improving medical technologies
With higher δ, individuals are able to consume more commodities over time as
implied in equation (4.2.4). Increases in δ raise the marginal benefits of supplying
labor during old age (see equation (4.3.10)). Accordingly, individuals offer more z
in equilibrium. To maintain the MRS between l and z, individuals have to reduce
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l. In our calibration, h decreases because the impacts of lowering l outweigh the
impacts of raising z in the government budget. Therefore, pi decrease as δ increases.
4.4 Optimal taxation
In this section, we explore optimal taxes from a welfarist perspective. We employ
the primal approach (see Atkinson and Stiglitz (2015)) to allow the government to
directly control the quantities.
By applying the first-order conditions into equation (4.2.4), we form the imple-
mentability constraint as below
vll − ucc− piudd+ pivzz − ucT = 0, (4.4.11)
where T is the lump-sum tax. The feasibility constraint is
wl + piδwz − c− pid− h = 0. (4.4.12)
The maximization problem from a government’s perspective is thus
Lg = u(c)− v(l) + pi(h) [u(d)− v(z)] (4.4.13)
− Ω [vll − ucc− piudd+ pivzz − ucT ] (4.4.14)
+ ψ [wl + piδwz − c− pid− h] , (4.4.15)
where Ω is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the implementability constraint
and ψ is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the feasibility constraint. It
should be noted that Ω = 0 in the first-best setting where T is implementable.
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To examine the second-best optimal taxes, we set T = 0. The first-order condi-
tions are thus
uc = ψ − Ω [uccc+ uc] , (4.4.16)
ud = ψ − Ω [uddd+ ud] , (4.4.17)
vl = ψw − Ω [vlll + vl] , (4.4.18)
vz = ψδw − Ω [vzzz + vz] , (4.4.19)
pih [u(d)− v(z)]− Ω [pihvzz − pihudd] + ψ [pihδwz − pihd− 1] = 0. (4.4.20)
From equations (4.3.7), (4.3.8), (4.4.16), and (4.4.17), we know that
R¯ =
ψ − Ω [uccc+ uc]
ψ − Ω [uddd+ ud] . (4.4.21)
From equations (4.3.7) and (4.3.9), we can derive that
ucw
vl
=
1
1− τl . (4.4.22)
We then know from equations (4.4.16) and (4.4.18) that
τl
1− τl = Ω
[
vll
vl
l − τl
1− τl −
uccc
uc(1− τl)
]
. (4.4.23)
Consequently,
τl =
Ω(σl + σc)
1 + Ω(1 + σl)
, (4.4.24)
where σl = vlll/vl > 0 and σc = −uccc/uc > 0 are the coefficients of relative risk
aversion toward l and c respectively.
From equations (4.3.7) and (4.3.9), we find that
udδw = vz + Ω [vzzz + vz − δw(uddd+ ud)] . (4.4.25)
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From equations (4.4.17) and (4.4.19),
τz
1− τz = Ω
[
σz +
σd
1− τz −
τz
1− τz
]
, (4.4.26)
where σz = vzzz/vz > 0 and σd = −uddd/ud > 0 are the inverses of the coefficients
of relative risk aversion with respect to z and d respectively. Therefore,
τz =
Ω(σz + σd)
1 + Ω(1 + σz)
> 0, (4.4.27)
Referring to equations (4.4.24) and (4.4.27), we find that optimal taxes depend on
the coefficients of relative risk aversion. With the same forms of u(·) and v(·) across
the two periods, equations (4.4.24) and (4.4.27) indicate an optimal tax scheme with
uniform labor income taxes over lifetime. For conciseness of the chapter, we only
present the variations in τl hereafter.
Figure 4.8 depicts the simulated variations in the optimal τl in response to the
changes in σc and σl respectively.
Figure 4.8: Variations in optimal taxes in response to the changes in the coefficients
of relative risk aversion
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4.4.1 The effects of changes in technologies with optimal
taxation
In this subsection, we simulate the economic impacts of changing production tech-
nologies and medical technologies when the optimal tax scheme is applied in the
economy. By fixing the coefficients of relative risk aversion to the benchmark pa-
rameter set, we are able to acquire optimal taxes in response to the changes in
the two technologies respectively. Figure 4.9 depict the variations in optimal τl
in response to the changes in production technologies and the changes in medical
technologies.
Figure 4.9: Variations in optimal taxes in response to the changes in production
technologies and medical technologies
Referring to equation (4.4.24), changes in τl are mainly driven by the changes
in Ω with the coefficients of relative risk aversion fixed in the calibration. The
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variations in Ω are depicted in Figure 4.10.
Figure 4.10: The variations in Ω in response to the changes in production and
medical technologies
As depicted in the left panel of Figure 4.9, optimal τl decrease in w because a
higher w reduces the shadow price of the second-best constraint Ω. The intuition
behind the relationship between w and Ω is that higher productivity makes the
economy more resourceful. The marginal cost of public funds is hence lower. As
depicted in the right panel of Figure 4.9, optimal τl increase in δ because a higher δ
raises Ω. Referring to Figure 4.7, increases in δ pose negative impacts on the public
fund h in our calibration. These negative impacts indicate the negative relationship
between δ and Ω.
In Figures 4.11 and 4.12, we compare the impacts of changes in production
technologies on the economy with benchmark taxes and those on the economy with
optimal taxes.
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Figure 4.11: The impacts of improving production technologies under optimal tax-
ation
Figure 4.12: Utilities changes under optimal taxation in response to the changes in
production technologies
In our calibration, increases in w pose similar effects on both economies in that
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c, d, l, z, h, and thus pi all increase as w improves. It should be noted that τk in our
optimal tax scheme is zero. The implementation of zero τk contributes to a smoother
consumption path with higher levels of consumption across both young and old age.
Moreover, under the optimal tax scheme, individuals also obtain a smoother labor
choice over time with lower l but higher z in equilibrium. As depicted in Figure
4.12, these variations in the economic variables transfer into higher levels of utilities
in our calibration.
In Figures 4.13 and 4.14, we compare the impacts of changes in medical tech-
nologies on the economy with benchmark tax rates and those on the economy with
optimal taxes.
Figure 4.13: The impacts of improving medical technologies under optimal taxation
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Figure 4.14: Utilities changes under optimal taxation in response to the changes in
medical technologies
It should be noted that the reason why the dotted lines in both Figures 4.13 and
4.14 look rather flat is because of the relatively large variations in the economy under
the optimal tax scheme. In response to the increases in δ, optimal labor income taxes
increase as a higher δ raises Ω. Higher taxes suppress the increases in c and d in
the face of higher productivity during old age (see equations (4.3.9) and (4.3.10)).
Nevertheless, the optimal tax scheme contributes to a smoother consumption path
with higher levels of both c and d. Individuals obtain a smoother path for labor
choices by lowering l and raising z. With the implementation of optimal taxes, the
economy also reaches higher levels of utilities as shown in Figure 4.14.
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4.5 Conclusion
We develop a two-period model with endogenous lifetime to analyze the relationship
between labor supply and the provision of public health care. In our model, the
provision of health care determines individual probabilities of survival into old age.
An additional spending on health care can generally encourage individuals to offer
more labor supply during old age. However, this finding is reversed if the additional
spending is funded mainly through taxes on old-age labor income.
Consumption and labor supply would be raised in the face of improvements in
production technologies. These increases transfer into higher spending on health care
and thus higher survival probabilities in our calibration. On the other hand, with
improvements in medical technologies which reduce the loss of labor productivity
from aging, individuals offer more labor supply during old age but less during young
age. In our calibration, the resulting survival probabilities are lower in response
to the improvements in medical technologies. The reason is that the fiscal impacts
of decreased young-age labor supply overshadow those of increased old-age labor
supply.
Furthermore, we derive a welfarist optimal taxation and find that optimal taxes
on labor income depend on the coefficients of relative risk aversion toward labor
supply and consumption. The implementation of these optimal taxes contributes
to a smoother consumption path with higher levels of consumption in both young
and old age. These optimal taxes also bring a smoother labor choice over time by
lowering young-age labor supply but raising old-age labor supply.
In this chapter, we assume that the depreciation of labor productivity in old age
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is exogenous. This setting can be extended by including the negative impacts of
health care services on depreciation rate. This extension can offer important policy
implication regarding the recent global trends of lower child mortality and increases
in chronic incapacitating diseases in adults. However, as this chapter focuses on the
impacts of increasing survival probabilities, we will leave this potential extension to
our future work.
4.A Appendix
4.A.1 Analytical analysis
We utilize the lifetime budget constraint and the first-order conditions to examine
the effects of taxes on the economy. Equation (4.2.4) and the first-order conditions
can be rewritten into:
c = (1− τl)wl + pi
R¯
(1− τz)δwz − pi
R¯
d,
uc
ud
= R¯,
vl
uc
= (1− τl)w,
vz
uc
=
(1− τz)δw
R¯
,
h = τlwl + τzpiδwz + (R− R¯)a.
Taking full derivative of the above five equations, we obtain that:
dc = −wldτl − pi
R¯
δwzdτz − pi
R¯2
[(1− τz)δwz − d] dR¯− pi
R¯
dd+ (1− τl)wdl
+
pi
R¯
(1− τz)δwdz + pih
R¯
[(1− τz)δwz − d] dh,
(4.A.1)
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dd =
d
σdR¯
dR¯ +
σcd
σdc
dc, (4.A.2)
dl =
−l
σl(1− τl)dτl −
σcl
σlc
dc, (4.A.3)
dz =
−z
σz(1− τz)dτz −
z
σzR¯
dR¯− σcz
σzc
dc, (4.A.4)
dh =
1
1− θ
{
(1− τk)wldτl + piδwzdτz − adR¯− τkdc+ [τlw
+ τk(1− τlw)]dl + τzpiδwdz
}
,
(4.A.5)
where
θ ≡ τzpihδwz ≤ 1.
The condition of θ ≤ 1 should not be violated; otherwise, the government can keep
generating revenue merely through increments in taxes.
Considering the changes in c, d, l, z, and h in response to the changes in τl, we
construct the problem into the following matrix form:
−1 − pi
R¯
(1− τl)w piR¯(1− τz)δw pihR¯ [(1− τz)δwz − d]
σcd
σdc
−1 0 0 0
−σcl
σlc
0 −1 0 0
−σcz
σzc
0 0 −1 0
− τk
1−θ 0
[τl+τk(1−τl)]w
1−θ
τzpiδw
1−θ −1


dc
dτl
dd
dτl
dl
dτl
dz
dτl
dh
dτl

=

wl
0
l
σl(1−τl)
0
−(1−τk)wl
1−θ

.
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We define the coefficient matrix above as [A]. The determinant |A| is
|A| = 1
cR¯(1− θ)σdσlσz {−(1− θ)[cR¯σdσlσz + σc(dpiσlσz + wσd
× (lR¯σz(1− τl) + zδpiσl(1− τz)))] + pihσd(d− wzδ + wzδτz)
× [−cσlσzτk + wσc(lσz(τk + τl − τkτl) + zδpiσlτz)]}.
(4.A.6)
We reform A by replacing its first column:
|Aτlc | =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
wl − pi
R¯
(1− τl)w piR¯(1− τz)δw pihR¯ [(1− τz)δwz − d]
0 −1 0 0 0
1
σl(1−τl) 0 −1 0 0
0 0 0 −1 0
−(1−τk)wl
1−θ 0
[τl+τk(1−τl)]w
1−θ
τzpiδw
1−θ −1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
wl
σl
{
−1 + σl + pih
(1− θ)(1− τl)R¯ [σl(1− τk)(1− τl) + τk(1− τl)
+τl] [d− δwz(1− τz)]} .
The derivative of c with respect to τl is thus
dc
dτl
=
|Aτlc |
|A| .
We obtain the following determinant by replacing the second column in |A|:
|Aτld | =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
−1 wl (1− τl)w piR¯(1− τz)δw pihR¯ [(1− τz)δwz − d]
σcd
σdc
0 0 0 0
−σcl
σlc
l
σl(1−τl) −1 0 0
−σcz
σzc
0 0 −1 0
− τk
1−θ − (1−τk)wl1−θ [τl+τk(1−τl)]w1−θ τzpiδw1−θ −1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
σcwld
cR¯(1− θ)σdσl(1− τl)
{
R¯(1− θ)(1 + σl)(1− τl)− pih [−σl(1− τk)
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×(1− τl) + τk(1− τl) + τl] [d− δwz(1− τz)]} .
The derivative of d with respect to τl is thus
dd
dτl
=
|Aτld |
|A| .
We reform |A| by replacing the third column:
|Aτll | =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
−1 − pi
R¯
wl pi
R¯
(1− τz)δw pihR¯ [(1− τz)δwz − d]
σcd
σdc
−1 0 0 0
−σcl
σlc
0 1
σl(1−τl) 0 0
−σcz
σzc
0 0 −1 0
− τk
1−θ 0 − (1−τk)wl1−θ τzpiδw1−θ −1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
−1
cR¯(1− θ)σdσlσz(1− τl)
{−(1− θ) [cR¯σdσz + σc(dpiσz + wσd
×(−l2R¯σz(1− τl) + zδpi(1− τz)))
]
+ pihσd(d− δwz(1− τz))[−cσzτk
+wσc(l
2σz(1− τk)(1− τl) + zδpiτz)]
}
.
The derivative of l with respect to τl is thus
dl
dτl
=
|Aτll |
|A| .
We obtain the following determinant by replacing the fourth column in |A|:
|Aτlz | =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
−1 − pi
R¯
(1− τl)w wl pihR¯ [(1− τz)δwz − d]
σcd
σdc
−1 0 0 0
−σcl
σlc
0 −1 1
σl(1−τl) 0
−σcz
σzc
0 0 0 0
− τk
1−θ 0
[τl+τk(1−τl)]w
1−θ − (1−τk)wl1−θ −1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
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=
wzσc
cR¯(1− θ)σlσz(1− τl){−R¯(1− θ)(1 + σll)(1− τl)− pih[lσl(1− τk)(1− τl)
− τk(1− τl)− τl][d− δwz(1− τz)]}.
The derivative of z with respect to τl is thus
dz
dτl
=
|Aτlz |
|A| .
We then reform |A| by replacing the fifth column:
|Aτlh | =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
−1 − pi
R¯
(1− τl)w piR¯(1− τz)δw wl
σcd
σdc
−1 0 0 0
−σcl
σlc
0 −1 0 l
σl(1−τl)
−σcz
σzc
0 0 −1 0
− τk
1−θ 0
[τl+τk(1−τl)]w
1−θ
τzpiδw
1−θ − (1−τk)wl1−θ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
w
cR¯(1− θ)σdσlσz(1− τl){−σz[dpiσc(lσl(1− τk)(1− τl)− τk(1− τl)− τl)
− R¯σd(−σdwl2(1− τl) + c(2τk(1− τl)− σll(1− 2τk)(1− τl) + τl))]
+ wzδpiσcσd[(τk(1− τl) + τl)(1− τz)− R¯(1− τl)τz − lσz(1− τl)((1− τk)
× (1− τz) + R¯τz)]}.
The derivative of h with respect to τl is thus
dh
dτl
=
|Aτlh |
|A| .
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The effects of changing in τz can be examined from the problem below:
−1 − pi
R¯
(1− τl)w piR¯(1− τz)δw pihR¯ [(1− τz)δwz − d]
σcd
σdc
−1 0 0 0
−σcl
σlc
0 −1 0 0
−σcz
σzc
0 0 −1 0
− τk
1−θ 0
[τl+τk(1−τl)]w
1−θ
τzpiδw
1−θ −1


dc
dτz
dd
dτz
dl
dτz
dz
dτz
dh
dτz

=

pi
R¯
δwz
0
0
z
σz(1−τz)
−piδwz
1−θ

.
We reform |A| into the following form by replacing the first column
|Aτzc | =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
pi
R¯
δwz − pi
R¯
(1− τl)w piR¯(1− τz)δw pihR¯ [(1− τz)δwz − d]
0 −1 0 0 0
0 0 −1 0 0
z
σz(1−τz) 0 0 −1 0
−piδwz
1−θ 0
[τl+τk(1−τl)]w
1−θ
τzpiδw
1−θ −1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
piδwz
R¯(1− θ)σz(1− τz){(1− θ)(1 + σz)(1− τz)− pih[−σz(1− τz) + τz]
× [d− δwz(1− τz)]}.
The derivative of c with respect to τz is thus
dc
dτz
=
|Aτzc |
|A| .
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By replacing the second column in |A|, we obtain the following determinant
|Aτzd | =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
−1 pi
R¯
δwz (1− τl)w piR¯(1− τz)δw pihR¯ [(1− τz)δwz − d]
σcd
σdc
0 0 0 0
−σcl
σlc
0 −1 0 0
−σcz
σzc
z
σz(1−τz) 0 −1 0
− τk
1−θ −piδwz1−θ [τl+τk(1−τl)]w1−θ τzpiδw1−θ −1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
−piδwzdσc
cR¯(1− θ)σdσz(1− τz){−1 + θ − [−1 + θ + pih(δwz − d)]τz + δwzpihτ
2
z
− σz(1− τz)[1− θ + pih(d− δwz(1− τz))]}.
The derivative of d with respect to τz is thus
dd
dτz
=
|Aτzd |
|A| .
|A| can be reformed into the following form by replacing the third column
|Aτzl | =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
−1 − pi
R¯
pi
R¯
δwz pi
R¯
(1− τz)δw pihR¯ [(1− τz)δwz − d]
σcd
σdc
−1 0 0 0
−σcl
σlc
0 0 0 0
−σcz
σzc
0 z
σz(1−τz) −1 0
− τk
1−θ 0 −piδwz1−θ τzpiδw1−θ −1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
piδwzlσc
cR¯(1− θ)σlσz(1− τz){−1 + θ − [−1 + θ + (δwz − d)pih]τz + δwzpihτ
2
z
− σz(1− τz)[1− θ + pih(d− δwz(1− τz))]}.
The derivative of l with respect to τz is thus
dl
dτz
=
|Aτzl |
|A| .
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We then reform |A| again by replacing its fourth column
|Aτzz | =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
−1 − pi
R¯
(1− τl)w piR¯δwz pihR¯ [(1− τz)δwz − d]
σcd
σdc
−1 0 0 0
−σcl
σlc
0 −1 0 0
−σcz
σzc
0 0 z
σz(1−τz) 0
− τk
1−θ 0
[τl+τk(1−τl)]w
1−θ −piδwz1−θ −1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
z
cR¯(1− θ)σdσlσz(1− τz){(1− θ)[cR¯σdσl + σc(dpiσl + wσd(lR¯(1− τl)
− zδpiσl(1− τz)))] + pihσd[cσlτk − wσc(lτk(1− τl) + lτl + zδpiσl(1− τz))]
× [d− δwz(1− τz)]}.
The derivative of z with respect to τz is thus
dz
dτz
=
|Aτzz |
|A| .
By replacing the fifth column in |A|, we obtain the following determinant
|Aτzh | =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
−1 − pi
R¯
(1− τl)w piR¯(1− τz)δw piR¯δwz
σcd
σdc
−1 0 0 0
−σcl
σlc
0 −1 0 0
−σcz
σzc
0 0 −1 z
σz(1−τz)
− τk
1−θ 0
[τl+τk(1−τl)]w
1−θ
τzpiδw
1−θ −piδwz1−θ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
piδwz
cR¯(1− θ)σdσlσz(1− τz){cσdσl[σz(τk − R¯)(1− τz) + τk(1− τz) + R¯τz]
+ σc[piσld(τz − σz(1− τz)) + wσd(−zδpiσl(1− τz)− l(τl + τk(1− τl)(1− τz)
+ σz(R¯ + τk(1− τl) + (1− R¯)τl)(1− τz)− R¯τz − τlτz + R¯τlτz))]}.
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The derivative of h with respect to τz is thus
dh
dτz
=
|Aτzh |
|A| .
The effects of changing in τk can be examined from the problem below:
−1 − pi
R¯
(1− τl)w piR¯(1− τz)δw pihR¯ [(1− τz)δwz − d]
σcd
σdc
−1 0 0 0
−σcl
σlc
0 −1 0 0
−σcz
σzc
0 0 −1 0
− τk
1−θ 0
[τl+τk(1−τl)]w
1−θ
τzpiδw
1−θ −1


dc
dτz
dd
dτz
dl
dτz
dz
dτz
dh
dτz

=

pi[(1−τz)δwz−d]
R¯2
− d
σdR¯
0
z
σzR¯
a
1−θ

.
By replacing the first column in |A|, we obtain that
|AR¯c | =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
pi[(1−τz)δwz−d]
R¯2
− pi
R¯
(1− τl)w piR¯(1− τz)δw pih[(1−τz)δwz−d]R¯
− d
σdR¯
−1 0 0 0
0 0 −1 0 0
z
σzR¯
0 0 −1 0
a
1−θ 0
[τl+τk(1−τl)]w
1−θ
τzpiδw
1−θ −1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
1
R¯2
{
pid
σd
+
1
(1− θ)σz [((1− θ)pi + aR¯pih)σz(d− δwz(1− τz))− δwzpi
×(1− θ − (1− θ + (d− δwz)pih)τz − δwzpihτ 2z )]
}
.
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The derivative of c with respect to R¯ is thus
dc
dR¯
=
|AR¯c |
|A| .
We then reform |A| by replacing its second column
|AR¯d | =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
−1 pi[(1−τz)δwz−d]
R¯2
(1− τl)w piR¯(1− τz)δw pih[(1−τz)δwz−d]R¯
σcd
σdc
− d
σdR¯
0 0 0
−σcl
σlc
0 −1 0 0
−σcz
σzc
z
σzR¯
0 −1 0
− τk
1−θ
a
1−θ
[τl+τk(1−τl)]w
1−θ
τzpiδw
1−θ −1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
−d
cR¯2(1− θ)σdσl{cσl[(1− θ)R¯ + pihτk(d− δwz(1− τz))] + σc[((1− θ)pi
+ aR¯pih)σl(d− δwz(1− τz)) + wl(R¯(1− θ)(1− τl)− pih(τk(1− τl) + τl)
× (d− δwz(1− τz)))]}.
The derivative of c with respect to R¯ is thus
dd
dR¯
=
|AR¯d |
|A| .
By replacing the third column, we rewrite |A| into the following form
|AR¯l | =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
−1 − pi
R¯
pi[(1−τz)δwz−d]
R¯2
pi
R¯
(1− τz)δw pih[(1−τz)δwz−d]R¯
σcd
σdc
−1 − d
σdR¯
0 0
−σcl
σlc
0 0 0 0
−σcz
σzc
0 z
σzR¯
−1 0
− τk
1−θ 0
a
1−θ
τzpiδw
1−θ −1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
−σcl
cR¯2(1− θ)σdσlσz {d(1− θ)piσz − σd[((1− θ)pi + aR¯pih)σz(d− δwz(1− τz))
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− piδwz(1− θ − (1− θ + (d− δwz)pih)τz − pihδwzτ 2z )]}.
The derivative of l with respect to R¯ is thus
dl
dR¯
=
|AR¯l |
|A| .
We reform |A| by replacing its fourth column and obtain
|AR¯z | =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
−1 − pi
R¯
(1− τl)w pi[(1−τz)δwz−d]R¯2 pih[(1−τz)δwz−d]R¯
σcd
σdc
−1 0 − d
σdR¯
0
−σcl
σlc
0 −1 0 0
−σcz
σzc
0 0 z
σzR¯
0
− τk
1−θ 0
[τl+τk(1−τl)]w
1−θ
a
1−θ −1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
z
cR¯2(1− θ)σlσz {cσl[R¯(1− θ) + pihτk(d− δwz(1− τz))] + σc[((1− θ)pi
+ aR¯pih)σl(d− δwz(1− τz))] + σc[((1− θ)pi + aR¯pih)σl(d− δwz(1− τz))
+ wl(R¯(1− θ)(1− τl)− pih(τk(1− τl) + τl)(d− δwz(1− τz)))]}.
The derivative of z with respect to R¯ is thus
dz
dR¯
=
|AR¯z |
|A| .
|A| can be reformed into the following form by replacing its fifth column
|AR¯h | =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
−1 − pi
R¯
(1− τl)w piR¯(1− τz)δw pi[(1−τz)δwz−d]R¯2
σcd
σdc
−1 0 0 − d
σdR¯
−σcl
σlc
0 −1 0 0
−σcz
σzc
0 0 −1 z
σzR¯
− τk
1−θ 0
[τl+τk(1−τl)]w
1−θ
τzpiδw
1−θ
a
1−θ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
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=
−1
cR¯2(1− θ)σdσlσz {−cσl[dpiσzτk + σd(piδwz(τk(1− τz) + R¯τz) + σz
× (aR¯2 − piτk(d− δwz(1− τz))))] + σc[dpiσz(−aR¯σl + wl(τk(1− τl) + τl))
+ wσd(−zδpiσl(aR¯− (aR¯− (d− δwz)pi)τz + δwzpiτ 2z ) + l(piδwz(τk(1− τl)
× (1− τz)− R¯τz + τl(1− (1− R¯)τz))− σz(aR¯2 + piτk(1− τl)(1− τz)− R¯τz
+ τl(1− (1− R¯)τz))− σz(aR¯2 + piτk(1− τl)(d− δwz(1− τz))− σz(aR¯2
+ piτk(1− τl)(d− δwz(1− τz))− τl(aR¯2 − dpi + piδwz(1− τz))))))]}.
The derivative of h with respect to R¯ is thus
dz
dR¯
=
|AR¯h |
|A| .
4.A.2 Calibration
This appendix calibrates our model on the UK economy. Referring to Leroux and
Ponthiere (2018), we specify u(·) and v(·) as below
u(c) = T1
c1−
1
γ
1− 1
γ
, (4.A.7)
v(l) = T2
αlφ
φ
, (4.A.8)
where T1 and T2 denote that individuals only work for a fraction of time. As in
Leroux et al. (2011a), we set φ = 2. In line with Leroux and Ponthiere (2018),
T1 and T2 are calibrated as 52 and 47 to indicate the case where individuals have
5 weeks of holidays per year. The initial value of l is chosen as 0.25 in line with
Prescott (2006).
We then calibrate the value of α from equations (4.3.7) and (4.3.9):
α =
T1c
−1
γ (1− τl)w
T2l
= 32.7489. (4.A.9)
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Survival probabilities pi follow the form suggested in Chakraborty (2004):
pi =
h
1 + h
. (4.A.10)
To calibrate the value of pi and h, we first look at the data on life expectancy.
Based on the data of Human Mortality Database (2018), the life expectancy at
birth in the UK was 81.4 in 2016. In accordance with the data provided by the
Office for National Statistics (2012), we assume that the maximal lifetime is 110
year. Therefore, each period would be 55 years long in our calibration. We can then
derive survival probabilities with the following form:
pi =
(Life Expectancy− 55)
55
. (4.A.11)
Therefore, pi is 0.4720 and h is 0.8973. d and z are calibrated as 0.7959 and 0.0475
by using equations (4.3.8) and (4.3.10).
4.A.3 The effects of taxes on utilities
Figure 4.A.1: Changes in utilities in response to the adjustments in taxes
Chapter 5
Conclusions and future works
This thesis explores the roles of public policies and endogenous health from three
aspects: the mechanism underlying the health effects of taxes, the structure of
optimal sin taxes, and the relationship between labor supply and public health care.
5.1 Conclusions
In Chapter 2, we develop a general equilibrium model with endogenous health to
examine the effects of unhealthy commodity taxes in the economy. We contribute
to the literature by providing the mechanism to explain a well-documented finding
that taxes on unhealthy commodities alone could be ineffective in promoting health
(as found by Fletcher et al., 2010; Mytton et al., 2012; Schroeter et al., 2008). In our
model, the economy is comprised of the goods sector, which produces consumption
commodities, and the health sector, which provides individuals with the stock of
health. Following Grossman (1972), the stock of health in our model generates the
so-called “healthy time” which is available for work. One novelty of our model is
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found in how it embeds individual preference for health in that of leisure. This
novelty allows us to detect the variations in labor supply in response to the changes
in policies. Although unhealthy commodities provide individuals with utility, they
pose detrimental effects on health. We find that, in response to the implementation
of unhealthy commodity taxes, individuals reduce not only their consumption of
unhealthy commodities but also their investment in health. Therefore, the beneficial
effects of reducing consumption of unhealthy commodities are offset by the negative
effects of reducing investment in health. In addition to the exploration of this
underlying mechanism, we also investigate the policy which promotes both health
and welfare more effectively. We find that, with revenue-neutral adjustments in taxes
on labor income or capital income, the implementation of unhealthy commodity
taxes can improve the level of health through income effects. Moreover, both reforms
contribute to higher levels of welfare in the long run. The results offer important
guidelines to policy makers: the introduction of a tax on unhealthy commodities,
for example a “sugar tax”, should always be coupled with a reduction in other
tax burdens in order to improve the level of population health and increase overall
welfare effectively.
In Chapter 3, we move away from the traditional paternalistic view to explore
the structure of optimal sin taxes based on the short- and long-term externalities
on public funds.1 We find that optimal sin taxes contain the Pigouvian element
1Studies of sin taxes usually take the paternalistic view which assumes that the government
knows better than individuals in terms of their own health (e.g. Cremer et al., 2012; Goulao and
Pe´rez-Barahona, 2014; O’Donoghue and Rabin, 2003, 2006).
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which corrects the short- and long-term externalities on public funds, and the effi-
ciency element which only appear in the second-best setting. In line with Bovenberg
and Goulder (1996), our calibration results show that the Pigouvian element in the
second-best setting is generally lower. The reason behind this finding is that in-
dividuals can tolerate more externalities since they value public goods less in the
presence of income taxes. However, the second-best optimal sin taxes are not neces-
sarily lower than the first-best optimal sin taxes due to the presence of the efficiency
element in the second-best setting. Furthermore, we calibrate the model on the UK
economy and find that the implementation of sin taxes has double-dividends in terms
of not only improving population health but also enhancing economic performance
and welfare.
In Chapter 4, we explore the relationship between labor supply and public poli-
cies in an economy with endogenous lifetime. We extend the basic model of Fletcher
et al. (2010) and Leroux and Ponthiere (2018) by including the roles of endogenous
health and tax policies. In our model, individuals can live either one or two periods,
depending on the survival probabilities which are determined by the provision of
public health care. We find that, in the face of higher survival probabilities, indi-
viduals generally offer more labor supply during old age. However, this statement is
reversed if the additional spending on health care is mainly funded through taxes on
old-age labor income. In addition, we investigate the economic impacts of variations
in production and medical technologies respectively. We find that, with higher levels
of production technologies, individuals increase labor supply in both young and old
age. These changes allow the government to collect more tax revenue. On the other
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hand, with higher levels of medical technologies, individuals offer more labor supply
during old age but less during young age. Survival probabilities consequently de-
crease because the negative impacts on fiscal budget from reducing young-age labor
supply overshadow the positive impacts from raising old-age labor supply. Further-
more, we derive an optimal tax scheme from a welfarist point of view. Optimal
taxes on labor income depend on the intertemporal elasticities of substitution. The
implementation of these optimal taxes contributes to a smoother consumption path
with higher levels of consumption in both young and old age. Individuals also obtain
a smoother labor choice over time with less labor supply in young age but more in
old age.
5.2 Future works
Various aspects regarding the roles of public policies and endogenous health have
not been the focus of this thesis.
First, we do not specifically examine the dynamic properties of endogenous health
in Chapter 2, because we focus more on the long-run changes in the economy. A
controversial problem of studying the dynamic properties of health is that individual
health might grow without limits in the model. To avoid this problem, we can extend
our model to further include endogenous longevity (as in Ehrlich and Chuma (1990)
and Kuhn et al. (2015)), endogenous mortality at each point of time (as in Hall and
Jones (2007) and Halliday et al. (2017)), or endogenous health technologies (as in
Jones (2016) and Kuhn and Prettner (2016)).
Second, we treat the internalization of fiscal externalities as parameters in Chap-
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ter 3. It would be interesting to develop a richer model with endogenous degrees of
internalization. The inclusion of habit formation in the model as suggested in Leith
et al. (2015) could be one potential way to enrich our model.
Third, in Chapter 4, as we focus more on behavioral changes of individuals, we
examine the economic impacts of taxes and technologies only on one generation.
This work can be extended into a overlapping generations model by adding the
interactions between different generations. Consequently, we can further cover the
discussion of other policies, such as pensions (e.g. Fanti and Gori, 2012; Pecchenino
and Pollard, 1997) and long-term care (e.g. Pestieau and Ponthiere, 2016).
5.3 Concluding remarks
In conclusion, the main contribution in this thesis include: (1) providing the under-
lying mechanism to explain why unhealthy commodity taxes may fail in promoting
health, (2) justifying and decomposing the structure of optimal sin taxes from a
non-paternalistic point of view, and (3) constructing a theoretical framework to an-
alyze the relationship between labor supply and public policies in the economy. The
additional consideration regarding this thesis include the dynamic analysis of en-
dogenous health, the exploration of endogenous degrees of internalization, and the
inclusion of the interactions between different generations. Moreover, we focus on
the theoretical aspect of the relationship between health and policies rather than
the empirical analysis in this thesis. We leave the empirical analysis in this topic to
our future work.
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